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CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
Although there is no unanimity of opinion concerning the principal 
aims and objectives of unemployment insurance, it is widely accepted 
among legislators, social scientists, employers, and unions that a major 
function of unemployment insurance is to provide some mmimum level 
of income protection to individuals \\ ho are unemployed through no 
fault of their O\vn. 
Prior to and during the early years following passage of the Soctal 
Security Act of 1935, vanous mruviduals and groups emphasized other 
objectives of unemployment msurance. These regarded unemployment 
msurance as a deVIce for stabilizing employment m the mdivtdual firm, 
for helpmg to smooth out fluctuations m the busmess cycle, for stabiliz-
mg purchasmg po\\ er, or as an mstrument for ach1evmg maximum utili-
zation of the labor force 1 
\Vhile the' arious pro\ ISions m the federal and state une•npolyment in-
surance laws reflect to greater or lesser degree all of the various pomts 
of viev; concerntng the objectives of unemployment insurance, its prin-
cipal function has gradually come to be recognized as that of proVIding 
a basic level of economic protection to IndiVIduals whose Income has 
ceased or been reduced because of temporary unemployment. Thus, m 
1946, the Social ecunt) Technical taff of the IIouse Committee on 
\\·ays and ~leans after a detail d study of social secunt') programs m the 
United States, stated that, uPerhaps the most generally accepted v1ew 1s 
that unemployment compensation 1s JUStllted primarily as a method for 
proVIding benefits needed to mamta1n unemployed workers and their 
fam1hes."2 
The unemployment msurance system \vhich has evolved in this 
country through the enactment, amendment, and interpretation of fed-
eral and state legislation has not attempted to provtde Income to all in-
dividuals \vho are unemployed ~umerous categones of employees are 
1. For a brief summary of the various views concerning the role and objectives of 
unemployment msurance, particularly during the early years of the program, ~cc 
Issues in Social Security, A Report to the Committee on \Vay~ and Meam of the 
House of Representatives by the Committees Social Security Technical Staff, 79th 
Cong, ht S ss. \Va-hington Government Pnntmg Office 1946, pp 368-371. A 
more detailed discuss10n can be found in Eveline Bums, "Unemployment Compensa-
tion and Soc1o-Economic Objectives," Yale Law Journal VoL 55, December, 1945, 
pp. 3-20 See also, Harry !alisoff, ·The Emergence of L nemploymcnt Compensa-
tion, I, II, and III," Political Selene(; Quarterly, June, S<:ptember, and December, 
1939 and "The Import of Theory m Unemployment Compensation," Political 
<;etence Quarterly, June 1940. 
2. Issues m Social Security, p. 368. 
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excluded from general coveiage under the laws.3 For those employees 
\Vho are covered, benefits are limited In amount and duration, and are 
restricted to mruviduals who have had a definite and recent attachment 
to the labor market, and \vho are currently 1n the labor market. Thus, all 
states requrre clatmants to have had recent eammgs in covered employ-
ment, and that they be able and available for work. Moreover, benefits 
are not paid or are postponed for individuals who, despite general cov-
erage and labor market attachment, have left their work voluntarily 
\Vithout good cause (or without good cause attributable to the em-
ployer), have refused suitable work without good cause, are unem-
ployed because of a labor dispute, or \vhose unemployment IS due to 
discharge for misconduct in connection with the work. These are the 
major disqualification provisions. 
The manner m \vhich unemployment Insurance has been performing 
Its function of mcome maintenance for temporarily unemployed work-
ers has been and continues to be the subJect of much research, discus-
sion, and debate m the federal and state legislatures and executive de-
pat bnents, and m academic, management, and union circles. Interest 
has centered on the extent to \Vhich the limitations and restrictions noted 
above are justified, desirable, and consistent with the objectives of un-
employment msurance Durmg the years smce benefits became payable, 
legtslatures have continuously altered the provisions of state programs, 
expanding therr scope in some respects and restricting them in others.4 
While all aspects of unemployment msurance have been hotly de-
bated, research achvity has been focused primarily on questions dealing 
\vith the adequacy of benefit levels and duration, methods of financing 
and financial eA-penence, and various aspects of unemployment insur-
ance admmistration. Relatively little research has been done, however 
by \vay of a systematic analys1s of disqualification pohcy and expen ence 
3 The major categones of employees excluded from COH~rage under the federal-
state system established under the Social Secunty Act are those engaged m agri-
culture and agricultural processing, employees of nonprofit in~titutlon~, domestic 
employees, state and local government employees, and those employed by vel) 
small firms (one to three people, depending on the state) Railroad workers are 
covered under a separate Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, and 27 state\ 
provide some form of coverage for theu own employees Smce 1955 Civilian em-
ployees of the federal government have been CO\ ered by a federal program under 
Title XV of the Social Security Act, in 1958 Title XV was extended to members of 
the armed forces. Benefits are paid by the state employment security agencies in 
accordance With the proVIsions and requirements of their own laws. Amounts paid 
to federal employees are refunded to the states by the federal government. 
4 For a discussion of the many changes m unemployment insurance during the 
years 1935 to 1955 see Employment Security Review, Vol 22, August, 1955 (entire 
ISSUe). 
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in the md1v1dual states, although a number of eAcellent works dealing 
more generally '"1th disqualification policy have been published.5 
Except for several mnumal federal standards primarily relatmg to 
\vork refusal the states have been fi ee to ec;tabhsh their O\vn disqualifica-
tion provisions.6 As \vas noted earher, the unemployment Insurance la\vs 
of all fifty-one states and terntones7 have, m one form or another, pro-
vided that tndn iduals '' ho voluntanly terminate their employment, are 
discharged for misconduct, ha\ e refused suitable \VOrk, are unemployed 
because of a labor d1spute, or are unable or unavailable for \vork \vlll be 
d.!squalified. Disqualification results In a denial or postponement of 
benefits. 
Analysis of experience under dtsquahftcation pro\ ISIOns Is funda-
mental to any study or discussion of the role and effechvene5s of un-
employment msur ,1nce In our complex of social security programs 
'"nether a claimant is to receive $30.00 per \veck for 26 weeks or $45 00 
for 40 \Veeks II), of course, of great importance. Ilo,vever, the disqualifica-
tion prov1s10ns determme \vhether a covered emplo) ec clearly in the 
labor force and clearly unemployed, gets any benefits for any \Veeks 
Coverage and eligibility are affected as much by the disqualification 
provisions as they are by the more drrect coverage and eligibility re-
quirements of the statutes Indeed, \vhilc general coverage proVIsions 
benefit levels and durahon pro\ J<;.Ions ha\ c gradually been liberalized 
5 See Yale Law journal Vol. 55, December, 1945, particularly the following 
wcles Glad}s Harrison, Statuton· Purpose and Invohmtnry Unemployment"; 
Kathenne Kempfer, D1squahf1cations for Voluntary 1 caving and Misconduct''; 
Leonard Lesser, Labor Disputes and Unemployment Compcn!'ation"; Louise F. 
Freeman, ''Able and Avru.lable for \Vork"; Arthur M. ~1enard, ''Refusal of Smtahlc 
\Vork"; Earle V Srmrell , "Employee Fault vs General \Velfare ns the Ba~lS of Un-
employment Compensation" Vanderbilt Law RevietA.~ Vol. 8, February, 1955, the 
followmg articles Paul H Saunders ·•Disqualification for Urwmployment Insur-
ance"; Jerre S. \\y1lliams, 'The Labor Dtsputc Disqualification. Ohio State Law 
]ouNl(ll Vol. 10. Spring, 1949, the following articl~ Louise F. Freeman, "Avail-
ability~ Active Search for \Vork,· Edwin R Teple, "Disqualification: Discharge for 
~hsconduct and Voluntary Quit.' See also, Ralph Altman, Availability for \Vork. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950. 
6 The Federal Unemployment Tax Act provide..<; thnt no stat<~ law will he ap-
proved for crediting of employer state contributions agamst the federal tax unless 
the state law provides that compensation shall not be demcd to any otherwise 
eligible indiVIdual for refusing to accept new work under any of the foUO\ ... ·ing con-
ditions (A) If the position offered is vacant due directly to a strike lockout, or 
other labor dispute, ( B) if the wages hours, or other conditions of the work offered 
are substantially le.ss favorable to the inchvtdual than those prevailing for stmilar 
work m the locality, (C) if as a condition of being employed the individual would 
be requued to JOlD a company union or to re..,ign from or refrain from joimng any 
bona fide labor orgaruzation. 
7. The 49 states, Hawaii, and the Dtstnct of Columbia. 
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smce unemployment msurance was first enacted, disqualification pro-
VISions have become more restrictive.8 
A study of disquahfication policy and experience in the state of Iowa 
IS of special interest As can be seen m Table 1, the over-all disqualifica-
tion rate, and particularly the rate of voluntary quit disqualifications m 
this state have persistently been well above the national average, and 
among the highest in the nation. During the first quarter of 1957, for 
example, Iowa had a rate for all chsqualifications of 27.6 per thousand 
clarmant contacts compared to a national average of 16 .. 5, and a voluntary 
quit dtsquahficat:Ion rate of 128.4 per thousand ne\v spells of insured un-
employment m contrast to a national rate of 37.3 9 Iowa thus had the 
lughest rate of voluntary quit disqualifications in the nation, and the 
fourth highest rate for all rusquahfications during this period. In the 
same quarter of 1958 the Iowa rate for all disqualifications was 16.1 per 
thousand claimant contacts, and 106 3 per thousand new spells of m-
sured unemployment for voluntary quit disqualifications. These com-
pared to national averages of 12.5 and 29.1 respectively, gtving Iowa the 
nation's second highest voluntary quit disqualification rate and the 
twelfth highest rate for all disqualifications.10 
It is the purpose of this study to analyze disqualification policy and 
experience in Iowa in the light of the objectives and philosophy of un-
employment insurance, and to exam1ne the impact of such policy and 
experience on indiVIduals \vho look to this social insurance program as 
a first hne of defense agamst the economic nsk of unemployment. Dur-
ing the past several decades Iowa has grown industrially and is likely to 
conb.nue to do so \Vtth industrialization, unemployment insurance m-
creases m rmportance not only because of the larger number of em-
ployees subject to the nsk of industnal unemployment, but to employers 
8 See "Trends in Disqualification, 1935-1955," Employment Security Revteu,., 
August, 1955, pp 41-46 See also Kempfer, op cit., Saunders, op cit., and Teple, 
op czt 
9 Statistical Supplement, Labor Market and Employment Secu.rity, June, 1957 
Table 9 "New spells of insured unemployment" are estimated on the basis of irub.al 
claims filed and monetary detemunations with sufficient wage credits "Claunant 
contacts" are estimated on the bas1s of new spells of insured unemployment plus 
continued clarms for which the state 1s hable 
10 Statzsttcal Supplement, Labor .\farket and Employment Securittj, May, 1958 
Generally, disquahf1caoon rates tend to dechne with an increa!>e m unemployment, 
smce a larger proportion of the unemployed applicants are likely to have lost their 
JObs for non-disqualifiable reasons dunng a downswing in economic actiVIty Tius 
appears to have been the case m Iowa where the rust quarter of 1958, m contra-st to 
the same quarter in 1957, was a penod of recession, although less severe than m 
other parts of the natwn For a discussion of the various factors affecting chsqualifica-
non rates through time see Labor 'Afarket and Employment Secunttj, July, 1954, pp 
21-26 35 
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TABLE 1 
Total DisquahfiC.atlons and \"oluntary Qwt D1squahf1Catlons per 1,000 Claimant 
Contacts and per 1,000 New Spells of Insured Unemployment-All U.S, Iowa, 
Kansas, M1ssoun, Nebraska orth Dakota, and South Dakota-First Quarter 1955 
through Fust Quarter 1958 ° 
QtT. Type Rate per 1,000 claimant contacts for total disqualifiCations, and 
Dtsq per 1,000 ne'v spells of insured unemployment for , -oluntary 
quit disqualifications T 
All U 5 Jo,,a ~ansas ~lo. eb. North South Iowa rank 
Dakota Dakota mU S 
-
1-58 Tot DlSq 12.5 161 15.2 9.1 13.3 16.0 8.5 12 
·----------------------------------------------------------------Vol. Quit 29.1 106.3 18 4 37.4 219 21.5 50.4 2 
4-57 Tot. D1sq 17.1 23.6 238 117 21.6 263 15.6 12 
-----------------------------------------------------------------Vol. Quit 29 0 77.7 233 35 0 26.2 14 5 45.8 5 
3-57 Tot De>q 22.3 30.5 25.1 16 6 34.2 42.1 27.4 14 
----------------------------------------------------------------Vol. Quit 377 121.7 33.1 526 50.2 66.5 .. 6 .... \) • I 2 
2-57 Tot D1sq 18.9 27.7 19.2 12.1 25.4 14.2 11.7 5 
-----------· ----------------------------------------------------· Vol. Quit 38.0 116.5 30 4 40.7 42.1 39.0 54.5 1 
1-57 Tot DlSq 16.5 27 6 16 8 12.4 17.3 13.3 8.2 4 
----------------------------------------------------------------· Vol. Quit 37.3 128 4 23.3 48.0 26.6 23.4 51.0 1 
4-56 Tot Disq 20.4 27.5 21.2 13.3 25.2 21.8 12.4 13 
----------------------------------------------------------------Vol Quit 33.5 76.7 29.8 38.6 25.6 21.0 38.9 7 
3-56 Tot DISq 22.2 18.6 30.1 15.3 34.6 48.6 11.6 36 
----------------------------------------------------------------· Vol. Quit 3 1.1 58.6 37.4 46.1 41.2 53.9 "C) C) ..... .., . .., 15 
2-56 Tot DlSq 19.0 24.9 24.7 14.0 30.4 9.0 16.1 15 
. - -----
--------------------------------------------------------Vol. Quit 36.3 110.3 36.3 52.9 36.9 u .o 50.5 2 
1-56 Tot Disq 17.2 283 19 3 15.0 15.0 11.1 8.6 4 
-----------------------------------------------------------------Vol Quit 36 5 144 7 29 2 62.4 27.8 24.1 49.4 1 
4-55 Tot DlSq 221 32.5 27.3 16.7 20.2 14.3 16.4 7 
----------------------------------------------------------------· Vol Quit 32.8 91.7 31.3 55.1 27.4 18.1 33.2 3 
3-55 Tot DlSq 24.8 34.1 30.9 18.3 39.3 35.5 23.5 16 
-----------------------------------------------------------------Vol. Quit 39.6 139.0 48.2 67.8 59.1 59.0 51.6 4 
2-55 Tot. D1sq 19.9 28.0 29.2 13.4 18.2 12.9 12.3 9 
----------------------------------------------------------------Vol. Quit 36.1 131.3 42.8 57.7 35.2 48.6 52.6 2 
1-55 Tot. DlSq 16.6 26.7 20.2 17.2 14.4 8.0 8.8 6 
·----------------------------------------------------------------Vol. Quit 34 6 137.0 28.2 64.4 35.1 o- 6 _, . 47.6 1 
0 Sourcl Statistical Supplement Labor J\Jarket and Employm<.mt ~aurity, ~1ay, 
1958 Mar<;h, 1958; Dec.., 1957 Sept.-Oct 1957; Junt HJ57; ~lan.h, 1957; Dec., 
1956 Oct., 1956; June, 1956; ~1arc.h, 1956 Dec., 1955 Sept., 1955; ~lay, 1955. 
T S eu ~pells of insured unemployment arc C!oitimntcd on the basi of initial daim~ 
f1led and monetary determination~ with .sufficient wage cn .. Uib. Claimant contact 
cons1st of nc'" ~pc:lls of insured unemployment plus continued claims for which tht..· 
~tate is hable. Total disqualifications include disqualifications for "oluntary quit" 
misconduct, not able or a\·ailable, rcfu al of suitable work, and mi,ccllant.'<>U.s w.c, 
quahfications which do not apply in all states. It excludes labor dispute disqualif1c.a 
tion.s. 
-( 
who must bear the cost of the program, and for whom unemployment 
insurance is a major instrument in helping to maintain consumer pur-
chasing power for thetr products. Moreover, the community as a whole 
has a VItal stake in the effectiveness of unemployment insurance. Recent 
recessions have demonstrated the 1mportance of this program as a bul-
wark agamst depression. To the extent that disqualification policy 
Inhibits unemployment insurance m fulfilling its important function of 
income maintenance, other less desirable programs such as public assist-
ance, private charity, or other forms of relief may have to fill the gap. 
As can be seen m Table 2, voluntary qwt disqualifications represent 
the majority of all disqualifications in Iowa During 1957 they accounted 
for 60 per cent of all those imposed. Misconduct accounted for 11 per 
cent of the total, and the not able and available disqualifications repre-
sented 28 per cent. Work refusal and labor dispute disqualifications 
were negligible. During the first quarter of 1958 voluntary quits repre-
sented 80 per cent of the total. 
TABLE 2 
'\Jumber and Distribution of Disqualifications by Type, Iowa, 1957 
and First Quarter 1958° 
Total Dis- Voluntarv Misconduct Not able and Refusal of 
qualifica- Quit ~ Not Available Suitable 
tionst Work 
Time penod ~urn- %of Num- %of Num- %of Num- %of Num-% of 
her Total her Total her Total her Total her Total 
1st qtr. 1957 4,998 100 2,864 57 580 12 1,507 30 27 .5 
----------------------------------------------------------------------2nd qtr. 1957 2,950 100 1,621 55 360 12 912 31 37 1.2 
----------------------------------------------------------------------3rd qtr. 1957 2,435 100 1,481 61 262 11 657 27 22 .9 
----------------------------------------------------------------------4th qtr 1957 2,777 100 1,915 69 290 10 553 20 16 .6 
----------------------------------------------------------------------Total 1957 13,160 100 7,881 60 1,491 11 3,629 28 102 .8 
1st qtr 1958 4,252 100 3,409 80 537 13 289 7 13 .3 
0 Source Statistical Supplement, Labor Market and Employment Security, June, 
1957, Sept-Oct., 1957; Dec., 1957; March, 1958; Nlay, 1958 
t Exc1udes labor dispute disqualifications. 
ot only do voluntary quits represent the bulk of all Iowa disquali-
fications, but the consequences in terms of loss of benefit rights are far 
more serious than is true for misconduct or not able or available disquali-
fications. In the case of voluntary quits, all benefit credits earned prior 
8 
to the dtsqualifying ,let are cancelled. For misconduct, the maximum 
crecht cancellation I~ nme \veeks, '' 1th most misconduct dJsqualificabons 
involvmg cancellation of only t'' o or three \\ eeks of benefit rights A 
not able or ,n atlable dtsquahftc,ltion invoh es no cancellation of benefit 
rights For these reasons this study I<; concerned pnmanly vnth voluntary 
qwt disqualification pohcy and cxpenence 
The anah SIS In tlus repo1t ts based on a study of all voluntary c1uit 
disqualifications Imposed dunng the fourth quarter of 1957 involving 
Inchviduals fihng claims In the Ced1.r Rapids Davenport, and lo\va City 
offices of the Io" ,1 Employment ecurity CommiSSion. Of the 1,915 vol-
untary quit dtsquahfications Imposed in Io,va dunng the fourth quarter 
of 1957, 272 or 14 per cent Involved clauns filed in the three cities 
studied. The 272 dtsquahftcattons tnvolved 236 indtviduals.11 
Cedar Raptds and Davenport represent hvo of the maJOr industrial 
centers of the state.12 In ~larch, 1957, these hvo labor market areas ( de-
fined by the Io,va Employment Secunty Commission to Include all of 
Linn and Scott counties) contained 20 per cent of the state's manufac-
turing employment and 13 per cent of Iowa's total nonagncultural em-
ployment.I3 Included 1n the two labor markets \vere 27 per cent of the 
state's durable goods and 14 per cent of Its nondurable goods employ-
ment. Table 3 mdicates the distribution of nonagricultural employment 
by mdustry for the state, Cedar R,lpids, and Davenport. 
The 272 disquahftcations Impo~ed m the three cities studted are, of 
eourse, not a random sample of all Iowa disqualifications m the fourth 
quarter of 1957. The) do, ho'' e\ er, present an accurate picture of the 
application of the rusqualifteahon prOVISIOnS to individuals In maJOr 
centers of employment containing a broad cross section of the states 
industry. 
The infonnation relating to the 272 disqualifications , .. as obtained 
11. In Iowa a separate dbqualification lS impos<.'<.l for each rusqualifying net oc-
curing in the ba-.c period, lag period, or post-lag" period. The base period is the 
hrst four of the last fhe completed calendar quarters preceding the quarter in 
"'hich an orirrinal claun is filed. The lag period is the period between the end of the 
base period and the date the original claim is filed. ''Post-lag" period refers to the 
penod between the date the individual files an original claim and the date on which 
he fil~ an additional claim. An individual committing more than one disqualifying 
act before filing his oribrinal or additional claim may be disqualified several times on 
the same claim 
' 12. Iowa CJt\. "as included in the study because of its convenient location, being 
the home of the ~tate Uruversity of lo\\3 \\here the ... tudy was carried out 
13. Data provtded by the Iowa Employment Security Commt,sion Stgnificant 
numbers of residents of Rock Island and Molin~ Ilhnois, work in Da\enport, and 
the figures for Davenport employment include resident-. of Illinois who work in 
cott Countv. 
~ 
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TABLE 3 
Estimated Nonagricultural Employment Total Iowa, Cedar Rap1ds, and 
Davenport Labor Market Areas, by Industry, March, 1957° 
Major Industry Group Total Cedar Davenport Cedar Cedar Rapids 
lo\\ a Rapids Rap1ds plus Davenport 
plus as per cent of 
Davenport all Iowa 
Total 1\Jonagricultural 632,450 44 600 36 090 80 690 12 8 
Total Manufacturing 168.200 20,990 13,130 34,120 202 
Durable Goods 86 200 13,440 9,630 23,070 26.8 
·---------------------------------------------------------------------· Primary and 
fabncated Metals 13,800 1,010 3,830 4,840 35 1 
·----------------------------------------------------------------------Machinerv 49,800 11,950 3,150 15 100 30.3 
~ 
·---------------------------------------------------------------------· Other durable.\ 22,600 480 2,650 3,130 13 8 
Nondurable Goods 82,000 7,550 3,500 11,050 13 5 
----------------------------------------------------------------------Food & kindred 47,950 5,740 2,590 8,330 17 4 
----------------------------------------------------------------------Other nondurables 34,050 1,810 910 2,720 8.0 
Total Nonmanufacturing 464,250 
Construction 28 050 
Tran~portation, 
Communication and 
Public Utilities 53,150 
23,160 
1,700 
3240 
22,960 56120 12.1 
1,960 3,660 13.0 
2,360 5 600 10.5 
----------------------------------------------------------------------Wholesale and 
retail trade 170,950 9,080 9,520 18,600 10 9 
----------------------------------------------------------------------Finance, msurance, 
and real estate 27,900 1,900 1,610 3 510 12 6 
·---------------------------------------------------------------------· Sctv1ce (except 
domesuc) and mi-.c. 73,500 6,340 5,950 12 290 16.7 
----------------------------------------------------------------------Government 107,700 1,280 1,340 2,620 2.4 
0 Excludes self-employed, unpaid family workers, and domestiC workers m private 
hou,eholds Source lO\\ a Employment Secuntv Commt\ston 
fron1 case file~ of the lo,va Employment Security Commission. When a 
clarmant IS disquahfied, a "1 otice of Dtsqualificabon" 1s mailed to him 
and to the employer Involved. The Claims Division of the Iowa Em-
ployment Securit\ CommiSSIOn proVIded the author with a carbon copy 
of each "p.;:otlce of Disqualiftcahon' mailed to clrumants during the 
fowth quarter of 195i. The " otice of Dtsquahf1cation" contains, among 
other things, the cb1manfs social secunty number by \Vhich the case 
10 
records are filed. The complete files relating to the 272 disqualifications 
were duplicated by the author with a copying machine and the copied 
records were taken to lo\va City for analysis. 
Each duphcated case file contained the employee's application for 
benefits, the employer's and employee's statements concerning the cir-
cumstances of the employment separation, the claimant's base period 
employment and \vage record, amount of benefit credits cancelled, and 
various types of inter-office memoranda relating to the claim. "Where 
disquahfication decisions \vere appealed the pubhshed appeal dec1sions 
were also utilized. 
It had been the author's original intention to intervie\v all of the dis-
qualified claimants in the three labor markets m order to obtain addi-
tional infonnation, but limitation of funds and personnel for field work, 
plus the fact that numerous claimants had moved or could othenv1se not 
be located made th1s unpractical. Ho,vever 63 of the disqualified claim-
ants\\ ere mtervie'' ed (mostly in the Cedar Rap1ds and Iowa City area), 
and \\•here appropriate such intervie\v infonnabon has been used to sup-
plement the baSIC infonnation obtained from the case records. 
Since the unemployment msurance case files are confidential, the 
claimants and employers involved in many of the cases dtscussed have 
not been Identified. Ho'\'ever, \vhcre material from appeal dcct~tons is 
utilized, the appeal case numbers are cited, since appeal decisions are a 
matter of public record. Disqualification policy in Iowa lS a highly con-
troversial subject. In order that the findings of this study might be 
vie\ved as objectively as possible the names of the employees and em-
ployers Involved in the appeal decisions have been \Vithheld. Anyone 
desiring to read the decisions In their entirety can easily locate the ca~e 
bv the case number and date c1ted. 
-' 
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CHAPTER II 
Basic Provisions of the Iowa Law and Framework for 
Analysis 
A Coverage, .thgzbtlity Requirernents, Ji uw1u;ing, and Adminz.stratwn 
The lo,va Employment Secunly Law covers employers who employ 
four 01 In ore \vorkers for some portion of a day m each of 20 calendar 
\\ ee1.~ \\ tthin a calendar year. Certain types of employment are exempt, 
and ernplo) ees engaged m such occupations are not covered by the la~. 
The eAetnpt employments a1 e agncultural labor and domestlc seiVIce, 
cmplo) n1ent \Vith the federal, state. and local governments, seiVIces per-
fomled for nonprofit organu;atlons, employment w1th a fam1ly member, 
and service performed dun.ng school vacations, or outside of school 
hours by StudentS \V ho devote their time and efforts cruefly tO therr 
studtcs 1 ather than to mc1dental employment. An exempt employmg 
unit nla) voluntarily elect coverage. On June 30, 1957, some 20,565 em-
ployer~ e1nploymg over 400,000 \\ orkers were subject to the law.1 
\Vcckly benefits are equal to 1/ 20 of the employee's total wages dur-
ing the calendar quarter of h1s base period m which earnings were high-
est. The base penod 1s the frrst four of the last five completed calendar 
<juarters preceding the date a valid clarm 1s flied. The maximum weekly 
benefit 1s $30.00 and the mrmmum 1s $5.00 To be ehgtble, an employee 
rnust ha\ e been pa1d, dunng Ius base penod, \vages of not less than 20 
times Ins \\ eekl) benefit amount. This means the employee must have 
earned a 1nimmum of $100. 
Each calendar quarter an amount equal to 1/ 3 of the employee's earn-
ings 1s credited to lus account up to a maxunum of $200 per quarter. 
These are referred to as benefit cred1ts The number of week for which 
an ernployee 1s ehg1ble depends on the amount so credited dunng lus 
base penod, and IS determined by dn·1dmg the base penod credits by the 
weekly benefit amount. Dunng the 52 weeks follo'\\·mg the filing of a 
vahd clarm ( the 'oenefit year"), an employee can draw no more than the 
amount credited to his account dunng his base period, or 24 times ills 
'" eekly benef1t amount, \\ hicheve1 1s less Thus, Iowa has a vanable 
duration\\ 1th a 24-week maximum 
Benef1ts are financed entirely by employer contribut:lons. The Federal 
Unemployment Tax Act leVIes a 3 per cent federal payroll tax on the 
frrst $3,000 of '"·ages pa1d by covered employers to employees during a 
calendar )e,u. As IS true In all states, lo\va employers may credit toward 
1. Twenty-frrst Annual Report of the lotva Employment Security Commisswn for 
the Fiscal) ear July 1, 1956- June 30, 1957 Des Moines, 1957, pp. 13, 16 
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the 3 per cent federal tax the contributions '" hich the) pay unde1 the 
state la'v (or wh1ch they ,tre excused from paying under the state's ex-
perience rating provisions) up to a maAunurn of 2.7 per cent. Inruvtdual 
employers pay their state tax at reduced rates under Io,va's expenence 
rating proVIsions, depending on the r,ltio that the C\.cess of their contnbu-
hons over benefit payments is to the aver,tgc annual payroll.2 The stale 
tax schedule based on tlus ratio 1s as follo,vs. 
'''hen the ratio is less than 2~l'i> the rate 1s 2.7% 
"hen the ratio 1s 2}.2% but less than 5% the rate 1s 1.8% 
"hen the ratio lS 5ctJ but less than 7J..?% the rate lS 0.9% 
'"hen the ratio 1s 732~ but less than 10~ the rate 1s 045(t 
'"hen the ratio 1S 10% or more the rate IS 0 0% 
Thus, under the lo\\a lav: an employer's state tax rna) vary from zero 
to 2.7 per cent. The employer pays the 0.3 per cent federal tax irrespec-
tive of his ratio. Employers become eligible for reduced rates ( 1.e be 
come "rated accounts,) after their accounts have been chargeable for 12 
consecutive calendar quarters 
\Vhen the state's Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund equals or ex-
ceeds $110,000,000, the 18 per cent, 0.9 per cent, and 0.45 per cent rates 
are reduced one-half and remam at such reduced rates until the Trust 
Fund is reduced to $70,000,000, at '''htch time they revert to the full rate. 
On June 30, 1957, Io\\a·s Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund con-
tained $110 388,986.33. In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1957, the Em-
ployment Security Commtsston paid $8 884 718.42 to 41 343 individual 
claimants. During the calendar year 1957 the average state contribution 
for rated employers'' as 0.401 per cent, '''ith 50.5 per cent of the rated ac-
counts having a zero contribution ratc.3 The rate during the calendar 
year 1957 for all lo\va employers 1ncluding unrated accounts, \Vas 0.7 per 
cent compared to a national average for all employers of 1 31 per cent, 
giving lo\va the se\ enth Io,vest rate in the United States 4 ( See Appen-
dix, Table A.) 
The Iowa Employment Security Law is administered by a three-mcin-
bcr Employment Security Commisston appointed by the governor and 
representing employers employees, and the public. Claims for benefits 
are filed in the local offices of the Iowa Employment Security Cominis-
ston and are sent to the central administrative offices in Des :\loines to-
gether \vith any other information relevant to the claim. All base period, 
2. Contributions minus benefit payments + average annual p tyroll. 
3. Twenty-first Annual Report of the Iowa Employment <.H urity Commh.~ion, 
pp. 11, 15. 
4. Data on average state rates provided by U 5 Department of Labor, Bureau of 
Employment Security. 
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lag, and "post-lag .. p c;riod employers are notified of the filing of the 
claun, and employers who wish to contest the claim must do so within 
seven days. 
The employee's claim, earnings and employment record, employers' 
statements, and other mformahon are assembled m the central office by 
a claims deputy who makes the origmal determination as to the claim-
anfs ehgibility for benefits. A claimant or employer who is dissatisfied 
\VIth the decision of the claims deputy may file an appeal, but must do so 
within seven days of the date the decision IS mailed. When an appeal is 
filed the case comes before an appeal tribunal ( usually a referee), and a 
hearing IS scheduled as eally as possible m the city or town where the em-
ployee and employer arc located . The decision of an appeal referee may 
be appealed by either party to the Employment Secwity Commission 
ctnd thence to a D1strict Court and the State Supreme Court. 
B. Dzsqualification Provzszons 
1. tatutory Language 
The dtsquahfication proVIsions wluch are the main focus of attentlon 
in this study read as follo\VS 
An Individual shall be disqualified for benents: 
1. Voluntary quztting. If he has left ills \vork voluntarily \vithout 
good cause attributable to Ius emplo} er, u so found by the Commis-
Sion. But he shall not be dtsqualified u the Conumssion b.nds that: 
a. He left his employment in good faith for the sole purpose of 
accepting better employment, which he Chd accept, and that he 
remamed continuously In said ne\v employment for not less than 
t\velve \veeks· 
b. He has been laid off from his regular employment and has 
sought temporary employment, and has notified lus temporary em-
ployer that he expected to return to Ius regular job \vhen It became 
available, ,1nd the temporary emplo} er employed him under these 
conditions, and the\\ orker did return to his regular employment with 
his rcgulc1r employer as soon as it was available. 
c. lie left his emplo} ment for the necessary and sole purpose of 
taking care of a member of lus lffiffiedtate family \vho \vas then in-
jured or ill, and if after said member of lus fanuly sufficiently re-
covered, he immedtately returned to and offered his services to his 
emplo}er, proVIded, however, that dunng such pen od he did not 
accept any other employment. 
2. Discharge for misconduct. H the commission shall find that he 
has been discharged for misconduct in connection with his employ-
ment, he shall forfeit not less than two nor more than nine weeks' 
benefits as may be ordered by the commission. 
3. Failure to accept work. If the commission finds that he has 
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failed, \vithout good cause either to apply for ,1vailable, suitable 
\vork ''hen so directed h) the emplo} ment office or the commiSSIOn 
or to accept suitable "ork when offered him, or to return to lus cus-
tomai') self-employment, If an\ 
a. In detei minmg \vhether or not an\ \vork IS swtable for an 
individual, the commisSIOn shall consider the degree of nsk involved 
to his health, s,tfet), and morals, his physical fitness and pnor train-
ing his e\.penence and pnor earnings his length of unexnployment 
and prospects for secunng local \\ ork In his customary occupation, 
and the distance of the available "ork from his residence, and any 
other factor'' luch it finds bears a reasonable relation to the purposes 
of this subsecbon. 
b \;onv1thstanding an} other pro\ ISIOn of this chapter no work 
,hall be deemed suitable and benefits shall not be derued under this 
chapter to an) othenvise ehgible IndiVIdual for refusmg to accept 
ne\v '' ork under any of the follo,ving conditions 
( 1) If the position offered IS \ acant due directly to cl stnke, lock-
out, or other labor dispute, 
12 ) If the \vages hours, or other conditions of the \vork offered 
are substantial!). less favorable to the Individual than those prev~uling 
f< r Similar \VOrk In the locality; 
( 3) If as a condition of being employed the individual \\ ould be 
required to JOin a company union or to resign from or refram from 
joining any bona fide labor organization. 
4 Labor dzsputes For any \veek \vith tcspect to \Vhich the coxn-
rmssion finds that his total or partial unemployment xs due to a stop-
page of \vork 'vhich cx1sts because of a labor dispute at the factory, 
e-stablishment, or other premises at 'vhich he is or \vas last employed, 
provided that this subsecbon shall not apply if it IS sho"m to the satis-
faction of the comrrussion that. 
a. He IS not participating in or financing or directly interested m 
the labor dispute '''hich caused the stoppage of 'vork; and 
b . He does not belong to a grade or class of '''orkers of \Vhich, im-
mediately before the commencement of the stoppage, there 'verc 
members employed at the premises at \vhich the stoppage occurs 
any of whon1 are participating 1n or financing or directly intere<st( d 
in the dispute. 
Pro\ Ided, that if in any case separate branches of \\'Ork \\ hich are 
commonly conducted as separate businesses in separate premises 
are conducted in separate depax bnents of the same premises, each 
~uch deparbnent shall, for the purposes of this subsection he deemed 
to be a separate factory, establishment, or other premises 
5 Other con1pensatwn. For any week with respect to \Vhich he 1s 
receiVIng or has received remuneration m the form of: 
a. \Vages 1n lieu of notice 
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b Compensation for temporary disability under the workmen's 
compensation law of any state or under a similar law of the United 
States, or 
c. Old-age benefits under title II of the social security act ( 42 
USC, ch 7), as amended, or Similar payments under any act of Con-
gress; 
d. Benefits paid as retirement pay or as private pension 
ProVIded, that rl such 1 emuneration IS less than the benefits which 
would otherwise be due under this chapter, he shall be entitled to 
receive for such \veek, If othern Ise eligible, benefits reduced by the 
amount of such remuneration 
6 Benefzts front other state. For any week \Vith respect to \vhich 
or a part of \\·hich he has recenred or IS seekmg unemployment bene-
fits under an unemployment compensation la\v of another state or of 
the United States provided that if the appropnate agency of such 
other state or of the United Stcltes, fmally determines that he lS not 
entitled to such unemplo). ment benefits his d•squalificaion shall not 
apply.5 
2. The Voluntary Quit Provision-
General Interpretation and Comparison with Other States 
The element of key unportance in Iowa's voluntary quit provision lS 
that the good cause for which an employee voluntarily leaves his JOb 
must be attributable to the ernployer or must fall under one of the three 
statutory exceptions If the claunant IS to escape disqualification These 
proVIsions are more restrictive than those found in a ma1onty of the 
states 
Of the unemployment Insurance laws m the 51 Uruted States Junsruc-
hons, 31 reqwre only that the employee have had "good cause" for leav-
ing \vork m order to avoid dtsqualificabon. These general "good cause· 
proVIsions have been mterpreted to include good personal cause. The 
remamtng 20 junsdtcb.ons have an "attributable to the employer" clause 
similar to that of Io\va, or clauses requrrmg the good cause to be "con-
nected with the \vork," "attnbutable to the employment," or "involvmg 
fault on the part of the employer "6 
5 Chapter 96 5, Code of Iowa. 
6 U S Department of Labor, Bureau of Employment Secunty, Comparrson of 
State Unemployment Insurance LatVs as of january 1, 1958 Washington. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1958, pp 88-89 Tlus publicabon lists 30 states w1th a general 
''good cause" provu;wn Effective October 27, 1958, ~tassachusetts deleted the at-
tributable to the employmg unit or 1ts agenf' limitation from its voluntary leavmg 
disqua.h.hcabon, bnngmg the number of states with a general "good cause" pro-
viSion to 31 (Commerce Clearing House, Unemployment Insurance Reporter, Vol. 
4, par 1975. ) A listing of the states accordmg to the type of provision found m their 
.statutes is provided m Table B of the Appenchx. 
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It has been the responsibility of unemployment insurance administra-
tors and the courts to give specific definition to these brief and general 
statutory provisions, and the meaning of "good cause," and "good cause 
attributable to the employer" have been developed as individual cases 
in the various states have been adjudicated. 
In the states which have a general ((good cause" provision, the critena 
for ··good cause" have been \vhether the claimant acted as a reasonable 
person \Vould have acted in the circumstances, or whether the circum-
stances causing the individual to leave \vere of a compelling or necessi-
tous nature and not merely a matter of personal convenience or advan-
tage.7 Thus, for example, in Kansas, leaVIng \\'ork to follo\v a husband 
to a ne\v domicile, and quitting because of imminent layoff have not 
been held d1squalifying 8 In South Dakota, leav1.ng \vork to move to a 
\Varmer climate to protect the health of one's children, and leaving a 
job \\'hich aggravated a chronic disabthty ha\'e been held to be for good 
cause.9 A ~orth Dakota CommiSSIOn has held that leaving to attempt 
reconcilation \vith a \VUe '''ho had requested a divorce \vas for good per-
sonal cause 10 Quitting JObs because of lack of transportation and be-
cause of pregnancy have been held non-dtsqualifying in Indiana.l 1 The 
Illinois Board of ReVIe\v has held that leaVIng work \vhich involved a 
risk to one's health, and leav1ng because of inab1hty to find housmg ac-
comtnodations 1n the locality are for good cause 12 
Even in some of the st,ltes '' hose provisions arc couched in terms of 
7. "Unemployment Benefits-Recent Appeal Decision~-Cood Cause for Volwl-
tary Quit:s"-The Labor ~farket and Employment Security, July, 1957, p. 17. 
8. App. Ref. Dec No 1617, 10-25-45, Commerce Clcarinh llou~c, Uncmplnyment 
Insurance Reporter, Vol. 4, par. 1975.253; App. Ref. Dec '\o 11,190, 12-12-49, 
CCH, Unemployment Insurance Reporter, Vol. 4, par. 1975.7330. In subsequent 
references the Commerce Clearing Home Unemployment Insurance Reporter will he· 
cited as CCH. 
9 Conun Dec ·o 453-C-221, 2-2-49, CCH, Vol. 7, par. 1975.094; App. Ref. 
Dec ~o 2084, 1-8 52. CCH. Vol 7, par. 1975.083. 
10. Bd. of Comm Dec No \VCB- 119-52 5-19-52, CCII, Vol. 6, par. 1975.27. 
11. Rev. Bd. Dec. 56-R-95, 12 19-56, CC 11. Vol. 3, par. 8226.04; Rev. Bd. Dec. 
~o. 57-R-6, 5-7-57, Bureau of Employment Security, Benefit Series Service, Un-
employment In surance, VL - 235 t 29. In ~uh c.quent references the Bureau of Em-
ployment Security\ Benefit Seric Service will be cited as BSSl'I. 
12. Bd of Rev Dec :Ko 54 - BRD-995, 4-20-54, BSS t I. \' L 235 45.-15; Bd. of 
Rev. Dec No 46 BRD-981. 10-22A6. CCH. Vol. 3, par. 1975.33 Smcc the enact-
ment of unemplopnt:nt msurance legt.slation there have been hundreds of cases in 
the various states where unemployment in~urance administrator and courts have had 
to rule on whether particular voluntary tcnninations \\. ue reasonable or compelling 
so as to come \\;thin the definition of "good cause . .. Smcc each case is unique, a 
detailed summanzation according to the various categonc.'i of circumstances would 
itself require a treab.se which cannot be attempted here. For three c.xccllent discus-
sions of the various state interpretations of good personal cause sec Kempfer, op. cit., 
Saunders, op. cit., and Teplc, op. cit. 
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.. good cause attnbutable to the employer," the admirustrative agencies 
and courts have, nevertheless, not disqualified clallllants where the rea-
sons for leavmg were of an extremely compelling personal nature, al-
though not attributable to the employer In some of these states the leg-
tslabon tself p ermttc; a number of exceptions. Thus, for example, the 
Appeal Referee 1n a Mtssoun case pomted out that, 'The word <volun-
tarily' Implies a freedom of choice on the part of an individual who has 
left work An individual, who is compelled to leave work by circum-
c;tances beyond his control, such as illness, does not leave work volun-
turily."13 The \VIsconsm law provides that a claimant will not be dis-
qualified if he "terminated his employment for compelling personal rea-
sons "14 
ebraska appeal tnbunals have not disqualified claimants who volun-
tanly leave 'vork wh1ch presents a danger to their health.15 A Minnesota 
attorney general has held that separations from employment which are 
due to forces over \Vh1ch the employee has no control are not disquali-
fying, despite the fact that they are not attributable to the employer, 
and the legislation Itself provides that the disqualification provision does 
not apply 1f the indiV1duars separation was due to his serious illness.16 
The Io,va law, as 1t has been interpreted, recognizes no personal cause 
for leavmg work (other than the three statutory exceptions noted 
above) thus foreclosmg consideration, from the standpoint of good 
cause. of many compelling but personal reasons for terminating one's 
employment If a voluntary quit is for a reason which cannot be attri-
buted to the employer, an individual will be disqualified, despite his 
availability for work and genuine efforts to obtain work. The extent to 
which the exact verbiage of the "attributable to the employer" clause 
has been follo,ved 1s perhaps best illustrated m the "bloody stump" de-
CISion of 1949 In this case the claimant \vhen hired had to use a crutch 
because of the loss of a leg at the h1p. He had obtained an artificial leg 
and d1d light work for the employer for a bout four years. He was then 
transferred to the production departinent where he carried heavy rails 
and angle rron. Thts \VOrk caused the stump to bleed and frequently 
broke the straps \Vhich held the artificial leg. After approximately a 
month of th1s heavy work he quit, smce the employer apparently could 
not furnish him hghter \vork. Because the quit \vas due to the employee's 
13 App. Ref Dec No A-4702-48, 12-6-48 CCll Vol 5, par 1975.07. 
14 CCH, Vol. 8, par. 4032 
15 Appeal Tribunal Decision No. 48, Vol XVI, 7-1-50, No 24, Vol VIII, 3-27-
46, o 41, Vol XIV, 6-20-49, CCH, Vol 5, par 1975 025. 
16 CCH, Vol 5, par 1975 06 and par 4047 For a summ.uy of exceptions to 
"attnbutable to the employer" c1auses in other states, ~ee Comparison of State en-
employment Insurance Laws as of January I, 1958, pp 89-90 
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physical condition and was, therefore, not attributable to the employer, 
the claimant \Vas d1squalilied by the Commission and his wage credits 
cancelled. 17 
3. Volw1tar} Quit Disqualification Penalty 
Under the IO\\'a law as Interpreted by the State Supreme Court any 
quit dunng the base, lag, or .. post-lag" penod \\hich 1s not attnbutable to 
the employer or does not fall , ... Ithin any of the three exceptions results In 
diSqualification) rrrespective of 'vhether or not the claimant \vorkcd sub-
sequent to hts quit and before filing his claim. :tvloreover, while section 
96.51 of the la\v does not specify the penalty for disqualification. it has 
been interpreted as requmng complete cancellation of all wage crechts 
earned pnor to the quit. These hvo basic mterpretat1ons of the ]a,v were 
set forth m a 1941 deciSIOn of the Io,-.ra Supreme Court in the Rhode 
Case 18 In thiS case, the claimant left \Vork \Vith the Io,va Public Servic 
Compan) on " o' ember 7 1939, in order to accept "better'' employment, 
<lS found by the CommiSsion, \vith the Viking Pump Company. This 
latter emplo) ment terminated on December 30, 1939, for lack of \\'Ork. 
Upon the filmg of a claun for benefits, both a claims deputy and the 
Appeal Tribunal found that anv disqualification resulbng from the 
claimants having left the Public Service Company had been removed 
by the subsequent emplovment. Upon appeal, the Io,va Unemployment 
Compensation CommiSSion, \Vith its chairman dtsscnting, affirmed the 
Appeal Tribunal decision This affirmance \vas upon the ground that the 
claimant was not to be disqualified because }us unemployment \vas the 
result of a lack of \vork, not the prior leavmg. 
The Supreme Court's ans~er to th~ Commission:Ps contention \Vas : 
The CommiSSion, in effect, \vould have us read into the statute di ~­
<tuahfying one \Vho has voluntarily left his work \vithout good cause 
attributable to the employer some such condition as "provided there 
IS causal connection behveen the voluntary quitting and the un m-
ployment.,, Tlus IS a matter for the consideration of tlw legislature 
\\"Ith \vhich tlus court cannot concern Itself .... 
'Vithout passing on 'vhether the dire consequcnc )s \vhich couns :.I 
anticipate \vill result from construing the section in question accord-
ing to the plain meaning thereof, it is a sufficient ans\\ er that this is 
also an argument to he addressed to the legislature and not to the 
courts 
The court then 'vent further and proceeded to construe the voluntary 
1eaving section as requiring that the claimant not receive an r benefits 
17 Comm Dec No 49C-102.2, 11-8-49. 
18. lOUJa Public Service Co v. Rhode, 230 Iowa 751, 298 N \V. 794 { 1941). 
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"based on his wage credits that were at the tlme of his voluntarily quit-
ting credited to his account, and to which benefits he would have been 
entitled had there been no statutory disqualification:· This language of 
the court ever sillce has been Interpreted by the Iowa Commission as re-
quiring the complete cancellation of the claimant's wage credits. Ac-
cordingly, the Iowa voluntary leavillg provision is so applied as to deny 
benefits for penods of unemployment which, causally, may be unrelated 
to a leaving of work It removes the protection built up by a worker 
through employment, not only With the employer whom he left, but with 
other employers as well. In 1945 the legislature attempted to make the 
law less extreme by enacting the three statutory exceptions These ex-
ceptlons from disqualification relate to situations ill which an illdividual 
leaves work to accept "better·· employment, \vhich he must retaill for a 
specified penod of time; leaves temporary work to return to his regular 
employer by \vhom he had previously been laid off for lack of work, or 
to care for a member of his unmediate family who \Vas ill or illjured. As 
\VIII be seen later, however, these statutory exceptlons have been gtven a 
very narro\v constructlon by the Iowa courts with the result of minimiz-
Ing the extent to which they have actually liberalized the la\v 
The nature and rmpact of the lo\va d1squahfication proVIsions and 
their interpretatlon on clarmant benefit nghts will be discussed ill de-
tail in the followmg chapters It might be pointed out here, however, 
that the lo\va policies of rmposing chsquahfication for quits which are 
from other than the illruVIdual's most recent \vork, and cancelling all 
benefit credits earned pnor to the qwt are not follo\ved ill the majority 
of other states and 1unsdictions In most states, disqualification is based 
solely on circumstances of the separab.on from the most recent employ-
ment preceding the filillg of a clarm. Only m Iowa, Wisconsill, :tv11chigan, 
Colorado, Lowsiana, South Dakota, Georgia, Missouri, Alabama, and 
Ohio do the statutes or court deciSIOns impose disqualification for volun-
tary separations within a specified penod regardless of intervening em-
ployment. In a few additional states the administrative agencies have 
Interpreted their la\vs as authorizmg disqualification for voluntary quits 
from other than the most recent employer.19 
In 33 states disqualification results only in a postponement of benefits 
rather than a cancellation of benefit rights. Eighteen states, including 
lo\va, cancel benefit nghts 20 Iowa, however, is the only state in which 
the voluntary leaving disquab..fication results in a cancellation of all wage 
credits earned prior to the disqualifying separation, including any prior 
19 Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws as of January 1, 1958, 
pp 88-90. 
20 Ibid., pp. 92-93. 
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,vage credits earned \vtth an emplo) er who laid the claimant off for lack 
of work. By contrast, the other 17 states \Vhich cancel \vage credits under 
the voluntary leaving ilisquahftcation, cancel only those crechts earned 
\VIth the emplo) er (or employers) 'vhom a claimant left under dtsquah-
fying circumstances. Thus, the penalty tmposed in Io,va IS unique mnong 
disqualifications for voluntary leaVIng 
Because of the defirubon of the base penod and because disqualifi-
cations are Imposed for qutts from other than the most recent employer 
it is possible under the present Io,va len' for an individual to be dtsquali-
fted and lose benefit credits for qutts \vhich took place up to 18 months 
pnor to the date he ftled Ius claim Thus, for example, assume an em-
ployee files a clairn on June 30, 1958 llis base pcnod 'vould be January 1 
1957 through December 31, 1957. If he had quit a JOb on January 7, 1957 
the benefit credits he earned from January 1-7 1957 \vould be cancelled. 
The later in the bas(.. period the quit occurs the greater 'vill he the 
amount of benefit crechts cancelled. 
If, after cancellation of credits, the individual has crechts remaining 
in Ius base penod he IS eligible for benefits based on such remaining 
credits. This IS referred to as an eligible dzsqualzfzcation. The principal 
result of such an eligtble disqualification lS to reduce the duration of the 
claunanfs eligibilitv. If no benefit credits remain in the base period after 
usquahftcation it IS called an ineligible disqunlification. If a disqualifi-
cation results m cancellation of all base period credits, but the claimant 
had crechts remaining in lus lag period as a result of lag period employ-
ment, such lag crechts are not available for benefits until the start of a 
ne'v calendar quarter. For example, assume that an employee qutts a job 
on January 1, 1958, and obtains another JOb on January 2, 1958. lie \Vorks 
at rus second job continuou~l} until ~larch 31, 1958, \vhen he is laid off 
for lack of \\'Ork He files a claim on April 2, 1958. His base period \\'Ould 
be January 1, 1957, through December 31, 1957. If the quit of January 1, 
1958, resulted In disqualification, all of h1s base period benefit credits 
\vould have been \VIped out and the indiVIdual \\•ould not be eligible for 
benefits until July 1, 1958 'vhen the penod January 1-~1arch 31, 1958 
conta1n1ng benefit crechts became part of a new base period. Thus, such 
a claimant \\'ould have lost his eligibility for almost three months despite 
the fact that he had \vorked for three consecutive months JUSt prior to 
the filing of his claim 
It should also be recalled that when a disqualifying quit t,1kes place 
in the lag or "post-lag" penod, not only are all base period benefit credits 
cancelled, but the crechts earned during the lag or post-lag'' penod pnor 
to the date of the chsquahfying act are also wiped out. This means that 
if the lag or ''post-lag., period becomes part of a ne\v base period when 
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the claimant files a ne\v claim in some succeedmg calendar quarter, the 
cancellation of creditS from Ius former lag Or ccpost-lag" penod results In 
a reduchon of benefit nghts in the ne\v benefit year. 
C. FrameUJork of the Arwlysis 
Of the 334 d!squahhcabons tmposed durmg the fourth quarter of 1957 
m the three labor markets studied , 272 mvolved voluntary quits, 42 re-
sulted from discharge due to misconduct, 3 mvolved refusal of suitable 
\vork, and 17 mvolvcd mdivtduals who \Vere held to be unable or un-
available for work. 
Table 4 classifies the 272 voluntary <1uit disquahfications a.ccording 
to the crrcumstances surroundmg the terminab ons.21 
In examinmg the voluntary quit disqualification experience under the 
lo\va law the analysis \VIII be focused on the vanous types of circum-
stances surroundmg the voluntary terminations and the resulting losses 
of benefit n ghts by employees An attempt \VIll be made to asse!)s this 
experience In the hght of the obJectives of unemplo) ment msurance 
generally, and particularly \vith reference to the public policy declara-
tion set forth b) the Io,va legislature \vhen it enacted the original legis-
laban In 1936. 
In secbon 96 2 of the Io\va Employment ecurity La\v the legislature 
'> tated . 
\ s a gwde to the interpretation and application of this chapter, the 
pubhc pohcy of this state is declared to be as follows. Economic 
Insecurity due to unemployment IS a sen ous menace to the health, 
morals, and ' "elfare of the people of this state. Involuntary unemploy-
ment IS therefore a subject of general Interest and concern \vhich 
requrres appropriate action by the legislature to pre\ ent 1ts spread 
and to lighten its burden \Vhich nO\V so often falls ' ' Ith crushmg force 
upon the unemployed "orker and h1s family The achievement of 
"iOCial secunty requues protection agcunst this greatest hazard of our 
economic hfe. This can be provtded by encouraging employers to 
provtde more stable employment ,1nd by the systematic accumula-
tion of funds dunng pen ods of employment to provide benefits for 
pen ods of unemployment, thus maintaintog purchasmg power and 
limiting the serious social consequences of poor relief assistance The 
legislature, therefore, declares that in its considered judgment the 
public good, and the general welfare of the citizens of this state 
require the enactment of this measure, under the police powers of 
the state, for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves 
21 With some modifications, the system of classification is that used by the U S 
Bureau of Employment Security in its Benefit Series Service. 
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TABLE 4 
Voluntary Quit Disqualifications, October-December 1957 Cedar Rapids, Da\enport, and .Iowa City Combined 
Col. I 
Heason for quit or 
type of issue 
To accept "better" emp. 
C) 
... 3 
Base 
period 
1\;o of l><mefit 
dtsquali- credits 
fications cancelled 
29 11,303 
4 
Base 
period 
benefit 
weeks 
canceHctl 
405 
5 
Lag or 
post-lag 
credits 
canceled. 
'\J'o of 
d,umants 
20 
6 7 
Quits from most Quits from 
recent employer .. c.1rlicr" employer 
(a) (b) (a) (b) 
No. of 
disq. 0 
0 
Benefit 
credits 
can-
celled0 
0 
Benefit. 
credits 
No of can-
disq. 0 ce1lcd 0 
29 11,303 
8 
~o of 
meligi-
ble dis-
qualifi-
cationst 
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9 
Eligible dis-
qualifications 
(a) (b) 
Benefit 
credits 
::\o of can-
dtsq. o celled 0 
5 1,348 
To accept recall to 
"regular" employment 36 14,334 482 15 0 0 36 14,334 17 5 5 .988 
Health or phys. cond. 33 11,690 407 17 14 7,533 19 4,157 21 12 1 909 
ln7;cssor1iiJ\~r)~---------------2r---a-sfa _____ 234 ______ ff ______ ro---4~699------rr---1~819 ______ f5 -------6-----523-
"Prcw~nnci ____________________ 3 ___ r'4scr-----41f ______ 2 ________ f ___ I,3_94 _______ r ______ sa _______ 2 _______ r ______ sa-
.ftisk-<>r1niie5s"O~-inJ.------------g----~722 _____ 124 _______ 4 _______ 2 ____ f,44o _______ 7 ____ 2.2s2 _______ 4 _______ s ____ r,33o--
11 3,926 141 6 4 1,158 7 2,768 7 4 815 
To attend school 4 1 840 62 2 3 1,640 1 200 4 0 0 
To enter self-employment 5 1 598 54 1 1 570 4 1,028 3 2 200 
Transportation & trnvel 6 2,125 71 3 3 1,451 3 674 4 2 674 
\Vages 19 5,705 210 7 5 2 .892 14 2,813 10 9 1 088 
Hours 5 1.459 54 1 1 623 4 836 3 2 587 
Nature of work 17 3,980 137 4 . - --- 13 -4 l ,ts'tJ~ 2,0~~ 7 10 1327 
\Vorking conditions 26 6,471 243 7 5 2,070 21 4,401 14 12 1,843 
Layoff imminent - 98·1 34 1 1 542 I 442 3 4 242 6 
Prospt~t of other workt 10 2,677 93 1 0 0 10 2.677 6 4 749 
Quit or discharge C) C) 7,474 253 12 8 3,966 
--
3,508 16 6 1,322 14 
Misc. 42 12,201 452 16 8 3,801 34 8,400 o-... I 15 3,310 
Total .272 87,767 3,098 113 57 28,138 215 59,629 164 108 21402 , 
°Col. 0( a) plus Col. 7 ( u) = Col 2; Col. 0( b ) plus Col. 7 ( b ) = Col. 3; Col. 8 plus Col. 9( n) = Col. 2. 
t An "ineligible disqualificaiton"' refers to u situntion where there were :uo base period benefit credits remaining ufter the date of the 
disqualifying quit. An "cHgible disqunlificntion .. rofcrs to n situution whc.re the.re were sufficient base period hcricfit credits remaining 
after the dntc of the disqunlifying quH to establish eligibility in the snmc quarter in which the claim was filed . 
~ t Thcsc refer to cases in which the "other work" did not materialize, or did not materialize immediately. Therefore, the issue of 
whether the new employment was "'better" or whether the claimant remained for 12 continuous weeks did not ar.ise. 
to he used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of 
their own 22 
Chapters III through VII vvill discuss those voluntary terminations 
resulting from accept1ng ((better" employment, retummg to a regular 
employer upon recall, illness or accident, returning to school, and domes-
he crrcumstances. These five categon es include 113 disqualifications or 
42 per cent of the 272 voluntary quit disqualifications occuring in the 
three labor markets during the pen od studied. Chapter VIII will deal 
\Vith the relation of the ((attributable to the employer" clause to volun-
tary terminations due to employee dissatisfaction with \vorlong condi-
tions, nature of the \\: ork and other factors. 
\Vlule the question of d1squalifymg claimants for voluntary quits from 
other than the most recent employer will be discussed at vanous points 
in Chapters III through VII \vith specific reference to the cases dis-
cussed there, this Issue will also be treated in more general terms in 
Chapter VIII 
Chapter IX summarizes the Iowa disqualification expen ence and ex-
plores Its Implications for the future 
22 Itahcs are the author's 
• 
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CHAPTER III 
Leaving To Accept Better Employment 
T\\ enty-n1ne or 11 per cent of the voluntary quit disqualifications rm, 
posed durmg the fourth quarter of 1957 1n the three labor markets 
tudied involved IndiVIduals \\ ho left the1r jobs to accept what they be-
he\ ed to be better employment. In 26 cases the d1squahf1cabons resulted 
from the fact that the claimanb dtd not remain at therr better JObs for 
12 continuous\\ eeks as required by the la\v, The remaining 3 chsquahfi-
cations resulted from findings that the ne\v jobs did not constitute "bet-
ter, employment. 
The statute Itself does not define '1)etter" employment, nor has the 
lo\va Employment Security Commission specified in detail the condi-
tions \\ hich a ne\v job must meet in order to qualify. In each ease \vhich 
anses the question of \vhether the ne\v job represented "better" employ-
ment IS left to the judgment of the claitns deput'\ subject to possible 
later modification by the judgment of the CommiSSIOn or the courts Gen-
erally. the deputies, Commtss1on, and courts have held that \vhere the 
ne\v job invoh es a htgher rate of pay, provides greater earnings because 
of longer hours or more regular employment, or appears supenor in any 
other tangible respect it \\'ill be considered better employment. 
'Vhile detailed cnteria for "better" employment have not been spelled 
out, the courts and the Commission have specified several types of em-
ployment \vhich are not considered "better.'' These are self-employ-
ment,1 seasonal employment,2 and previous regular emplovment.3 An 
emplo) ee quitting his job to accept any of these three types of \vork 
cannot escape d1squahfication by pleading that they represented "bet-
ter" employment . 
. Failure To Renzain Twelve Con~ecutive \Veeks 
-\detailed examination of the case htstones of the claimants mvolved 
in 26 of the disqualifications Indicated that In none of these cases was 
the 'Detter·~ nature of the ne\v employment questioned. In all 26 d1s-
1 Commission Decision No 55C-2120, 7-29· 55. 
2. Fred R. Turnbull v. lot.La Employment Security Commission and Afason City 
Brick and Ttle Co.:~ Cerro Gordo County Distnct Court, 10-20-47. Commission Dc-
ClSlon o 47C-682, 7-17-47. Seasonal employment under the Iowa statutes refers 
only to the • canning season" defined as "the period during which fresh peri habl(• 
frwts or vegetables are bemg processed, and in addition thereto preparatory and 
cleanup periods of four days prior to, and four subsequent to said processing period." 
(Rule 8 for the Administration of the Iowa Employment Secunty La\v,) 
3 . Johnson Machine Works o Iowa Employment Security Commission ?vfonroc 
County District Court, 10-20-54, BSSUI, VL-350- 5-41. 
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qualification~ the claims deputies found that the new JOb did represent 
''better" employment. The sole ground for disquahf1cation was that the 
employees did not remain at the better JObs for 12 contmuous weeks 
r\s ',tn be seen in Table 5 6 of the d1squah£Ications mvolved md!Vl-
du,ds ' rho remained at theu bettei JObs 10 or more weeks, 11 who re-
tnJ.nH.~d 5 to 9 \veeks, and 9 who remained 4 weeks or less. One of the 
claimanb actually l emf.uned On IDS better JOb for 14 weeks, but these 
\Vere Interrupted by one day of unemployment wruch occurred m the 
de\ enth \veek In this case the clarmant \vas employed on a construction 
job, and the one day of unemployment was due to the completion of the 
job and the xnovement of the employer to a new job site m another loca-
tion. The claimant returned to \vork for the same employer at the ne\\-
job site after thiS lapse of one day. lie was rusqualified, however, be· 
cause the one day of unemployment meant ills 14 weeks had not been 
contznuous As a consequence $720 in base penod benef1t credits ( 24 
\Ve~ks of benef1t rights ) \vere cancelled. 
fABLE 5 
Di tribution of 26 Dis<p~tthfications Resulting from Failure To Remain at Better 
Employment for 12 Continuous \Veeks, Accorchng to Number of Weeks 
Claimanb Actually \Vorked on Better Jobs 
\ V cck~ \\or ked 
on better 
jobs 
~umber of 
D1!)qualifications 
L~s 
than 
1 1 
2 0 
2 3 4 
2 3 3 
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 3 3 1 4 1 0 0 
o Claimant" orked for 14 weeks for the ~arne " better·· employer, but lus work was 
interrupted by one day of unemployment m the 11th week. 
Of the 26 disqualifications, 13mvolved xnd1viduals vvho obta1ned other 
employment subsequent to termmahon of theu "better,. jobs and re-
Inained at such subsequent employment for periods rangmg from 4 to 
55 \\ eeks before bccommg unemployed and filing theu cla1ms The 
claimants \Vere disqualified, ho\vever, smce under a 1955 deciSion of an 
I O\va Distnct Court, the phrase "he remained continuously m said new 
employment for not less than 12 \veeks,. apphes only to the time the 
claimant remained 1n the job which he accepted after leaving his original 
employment.4 The remaining 13 disquahfications involved claimants 
4. Afullen v. lou;a Employment Security Comrmsswn. \Voodhur\- County Distnct 
Court, 7-12-55, BSSUI, VI..-350.5-59 
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\vho had no Inter\ening emplo)ment bet\\een the dates they lost their 
.. better'' JObs and the dates th~) filed then claims.5 
In 20 of the 26 cases none of the "better" 01 subsequent employers 
contested the claims 1\or rud the claims deputies flnd any disqualifying 
crrcum~tances suiTounding the termination of the <(better" or subsequent 
JObs In all 20 cases the disqualifications resulted solely from the earlier 
<puts to ,lccept the "better" employment. In another three cases where 
the "better· employers did f1le protests, the claims deputies ruled that 
the Individuals had left their "better" JObs under circumstances \vluch 
\Vere not rusquahfymg 6 The disqualifications \Vere imposed because of 
the earlier qu1ts Invoh ed in acceptmg the "better" jobs. In the remain-
Ing three cases the «better" or su bsequcnt employers as \vell as the origi-
nal emplovers contested the claims and multiple disqualificanons \Vere 
imposed 1n each case smce the claunants had left their "better" or sub-
sequent JObs for reasons not attributable to the employers 
The loss of base penod benefit creditS resulting from the 26 rusquali-
ftcations totaled $10,430, amounting to 367 \Veeks of benefit rights. In 
19 cases cred1t~ earned during the lag or "post-lag" periods were also 
cancelled. smce the d1squahfymg quits took place during the lag or 
"post-lag" penods 7 Of the 26 disqualifications 22 resulted in a complete 
loss of eligtbility under the state law, \vhile for 4 employees some eligt-
hi.hty remained. For these 4 ho'' ever, the average loss of benefit nghts 
, .. as 9 \\'eeks. 
The desrrability of the pro\ ISion of the lo,va la\v requiring employees 
, .. ,ho leave a job to accept ·oetter· employment to remain in that emplov-
ment for 12 continuous \veeks in order to avoid disqualification lS open 
to serious question. There are numerous rcc1sons \vhy an employee might 
not rematn in a ne'" JOb for 12 continuous '''eeks ,.\, recession \Vith a con-
5. Of the 13 claimants who had no empl0)1ncnt between the time they lost their 
"better" jobs and the dat~ thcv filed their claim 1 5 were interviewed on date 
ranging from 13 to 24 weeks following the filing of their claims. \Vhilc all fiv<' 
claimants had some employment after filing their claims, they had been unemployed 
for periods rangtng up to 22 week!\. All were working on the date of interview and 
.til indicated they had been in the labor market during their period~ of unemployment 
md had sought work through periodic vbits to the United States Employment 
crvice, private employment agencies, or direct vi its to company offic~. 
6. In these three ca\es the deputies ruled that the employees had left their better 
jobs h<..>cause of ( 1) convenience of the employer, ( 2) mutual con ent after hire 011 
a trial basis, and ( 3) di charge for convenience of the employer. 
7. \Vhen an employee file.~ an original claim and receives henefib on that claim 
a base period and benefit year arc estahli~hcd. If the employee returns to \VOrk aft •r 
dra\\ing benefits, but at a later date in his benefit year again becomes unemployed 
and files an additional claim, the original ba:,e period and benefit ) car are still 
applicable. ''Post-lag" period refers to the period from the beginning of the claim-
ant' benefit vear to the date he filed his additional claim. 
" 
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sequent decrease in the general level of employment, or misjudgement 
by the employer or employee as to the incL.VIdual's ability to do the work 
are h\ o of the most rmportant reasons why employees changing to 'bet-
ter" JC bs might not remain there for the required period of hme.8 In 23 of 
the 26 cases noted above the claunants left their "better" JObs either be-
cause of the mabihty of the "better" employers to provide work, or 
because of employer recognition of the inability of the employees to do 
the JOb satlsfactonly. 
Under the frrst type of circum~tance the 12-\veek requirement has no 
logtc stnce the ability of an employer to continue to employ a worker 
depends on the business conrubons and outlook faced by the employer, 
and on all of the basic economic van ables which determine the general 
and specuic demand m the employer's market. The date on wh1ch a par-
ocular employer must reduce his labor force has httle, u anything, to 
do with the date he hired any one mcLvidual. Moreover, because of 
seniority and other related practices, the employees most recently hrred 
are the ones most h1.ely to be affected frrst by a layoff. Thus, the hard-
slups of a recession such as that ·which occurred durmg the fourth quar-
ter of 1957 are Intensified smce the protection of unemployment insur-
ance 1s withheld from the mdiVIdual unlucky enough to have attempted 
to rmprove hunself during or shortly before a busmess recession. 
In the case of a termination due to the Inability of an employee to per-
form the JOb saosfactonly, the 12-\veek requirement will almost cer-
tainly result m disquahfication smce m most types of employment less 
than 12 weeks are requrred to determine the inadequacy of an em-
ployee's performance. Thus, an employee seeking to unprove his earn-
tngs, hours, or othei work.mg conditions by changmg JObs is penalized 
for doing so If he or his employer \vere overly optunish c as to the em-
plo) ee's ability 
Possible unemplo) ment, sevenng of past \Vorkmg relationships or 
friendships, the possible necessity of moVIng, unhappmess in a new JOb, 
are all n sks or possible consequences Inherent m changing jobs. Can one 
JUShfy the addition of another penalty ( loss or reduction of unemploy-
Inent Insurance benefits) should the ne\\ JOb not \vork out sa.bsfactorily 
for 12 conhnuous \veeks? 
Dental or reduction of unemployment Insurance benefits under such 
circumstances cannot but discourage the Individual mibahve, self-reh-
ancc, and self-help '' luch \ve in the Un1ted States pnze so highly and 
8 There are, of course, many reasons of a p ersonal nature \\ hy an employee 
nught not remain at Ius "better" JOb for 12 continuous weeks The 1ssue of whether 
or not quitting for good p ersonal cause should result in disquahf1cat10n will be dh-
ct sscd m the follow1ng <..hapters 
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desire to encourage. In 3 of the 26 cases the JObs which the claimants 
voluntanly left provided less than full-tune employment. Thus, \vhen 
they found themselves laid off from their "better" jobs these three in-
dividuals \vere denied benefits as a result of having sought and found 
full-time employment The disqualuication of these three individuals 
resulted 1n a cancellation of $1,488 in bas(\ peiiod benefit credits totaling 
62 \veeks of benefit nghts 
A fourth cla1mant left Ius JOb for "better" employment because he felt 
the hours \\ ere too long and the earnings too lov; on his ongmal JOb. The 
~'better" employment, hO\\e\er lasted only 4 \veeks Upon termination 
of the ~'better" employment the claimant secured another JOb \vhich 
lasted approximate!) 3 months before he " as laid off and filed a claim. 
In the course of lookmg for '''ork after filing lus claim he \\as offered 
the original JOb \vluch he had voluntarily left. \Vhen h1s unetnployment 
msurance claim "as adjudicated the original emplor er contested the 
claun on the ground that the exnployee had quit and also on the ground 
that he did not accept the JOb \\hen it ''as again offered to him The 
clauns deputy ruled that the claunant \\as not required to accept Ius ori-
gmal JOb because 1t \vas not suitable. The employee \vas d1squahfied, 
however, for haVing voluntanl) left this job \\'Ithout good cause attrib-
utable to the employer Thus one obsen. e~ the paradox under the pres 
ent la\v of an individual being disqualified as a result of ha\ 1ng left an 
unsuitable JOb for a more suitable one. 
\\There Individuals \ oluntarily leave their jobs for better employment 
1t seems difficult to JUShfy the setting of any pcnod for \vhich the em-
ployee must remain at the "better" employment to escape disqualifica-
tion. Any period no matter ho'' 5hort, will be arbitrary and \\'Ill be un-
related to ,,·hether or not payment of benefits is JUStifiable. If an em-
ployee leaves his ·better,, or subsequent job for an arbitral) reason he 
\vlll be d1squahf1ed for thzs cp.1it, and there is little danger that leaving 
for recognized better employment can he used as a means of subverting 
the objeCtl\ es of unemployment Insurance>. It '"as noted above, for ex-
ample that In three cases ''here c1aimants left thmr better" JObs for dis 
qualifta hie reasons the) ''ere in fact disqualified. 
B. l ew Employrnent ?\ot "Better Employrnent" 
Three c1aimants left their \\'Ork to accept \vhat they believed \vas 
better employment, but while all three remained on their ne\v jobs for 
more than 12 continuous \Veeks, they were disqualified because their 
new jobs \\'ere held not to meet the criteria of "better" employment. The 
time penods elapsing behveen the dates of the disqualifying quits and 
the dates the Individuals filed their claims \Vere 16, 33, and 49 \veeks 
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\vith the bulk of these penod'i being spent working for the ''better" or 
subsequent employers 
In one case the ne\v JOb paid only three cents per hour mo1e, but pro-
vided between 50 and 60 hours of work per week 1n companson to the 
old JOb \vhich provided only 20 to 25 hours of \vork per week. The new 
JOb, however, was 1n the pettshablc fruit and vegetable canning industry, 
and the claimant was disqualified because such ~'seasonal" employment 
1s not cons1dered "better" employment under the Iowa la\v. In another 
c,1se the employee had accepted the ne\v job because it proVIded pay-
Inent on a commiSSion basis, and the employee anticipated that it \vould 
\ teld him a larger 1ncome than the salary of $225 per month he had been 
recetvmg on his old position. As It turned out, the new JOb yielded only 
$39 00 per \veek 1n commissions and \vas therefore held not to be "better" 
employment Thus, mere expectation that a new job \vill )'leld a higher 
income IS not sufficient to meet the requirements of ''better" employ-
ment. If the ne'v job turns out not to yield a higher income It is not con-
sidered "better" employment 
Quite aside from the matter of the critena used to determme the mer-
Its of one JOb relative to another, the question needs to be raised as to 
\vhether under certain conditiOns supenority of one job in comparison 
\VIth another IS really relevant to the issue of whether unemployment 
benefits should be paid. An IndiVIdual usually changes jobs because in 
his own rrund he believes ( nghtly or wrongly ) that one job is better 
than another. The mchvidual may be sadly mistaken m this belief, but 
1t IS one of the basic tenets of a free society that employees should be free 
to move from JOb to job \VIthout being punished for domg so. Should 
not the ans,ver to the question of whether or not to pay unemployment 
benefits to an mdiVIdual \vho un\visely changed jobs depend on whether 
or not the unemployn1ent for which he is claiming benefits was caused 
by the arbitrary or un\vise change of JObs? When the individual's unem-
ployment for \vhich he IS seekmg benefits is not related to the fact that 
he arbitrarily changed JObs sometrme in the past, is it sound public poli-
cy to deny him benefits and cancel his \vage credits? 
Since the expenence rating provisions of the Iowa law and other state 
laws provide that employer tax rates are to vary directly or indirectly ac-
cording to the amount of benefits charged to their accounts, it is under-
standable that employers \vould consider it unfair for their accounts to 
be charged for benefit payments resultmg from unemployment for 
\vluch they are not responsible. It IS not the purpose here to reopen the 
controversy 1nvolvmg the theory and practice of experience rating. This 
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has been discussed frequent!) and at length else'' liere.9 For purpose~ of 
this discussion 1t is assumed that experience rating 1s "here to stai re-
gardless of its ment or lack of ment. It 1s possible 'vithm the context of 
experience rating ho\vever~ to ensure that the question of ··employer 
fault" does not 1eopard1ze the nghts of indiVIduals to beneftts. If tlu~ 
ts to be accomplished, one basic fact needs to be recognized. \ Vhethcr 
under particular circumstances <m employer s account should be 
charged, and \vhether under these same crrcumstances benefits should 
be paid to a claimant, are h' o separate and dtstmct questions, each of 
\vhich can be considered on its O\vn ments It does not follo\v that em-
ployees must necessan.ly be dented benefits because one cannot JUStify 
charging a particular employe1 '-> account. 
The maJOrity of states have recognized the 1nent5 of treating the t\vo 
questions separately, 'vhile still preserving \vhat the) believe to be the 
advantages of experience rating. Tlus ts accomplished by the ust of "non-
charging'' provisions under \vluch benefits paid to claimants under cer-
tain crrcumstances are not charged to employer .1ccounts, but arc 
charged to a general account so that indtv1dual etnplo) lr tax rates are 
not affected. Thi.rty-srx states do not charge employer accounts \vher(l 
beneftts are paid follO\\fmg a potentially disqualifying quit for wluch no 
dtsquahftcation 1s Imposed, or follo,ving a period of disqualification 
'"here dtsqualihcahon results in a postponement of benefits rather than 
a cancellation of benefit nghts 1 
The use of .. non charging" provisions cnahk'> a state ( 1) to recogni~e 
that the1e are numerous circumstances, such as leaving for better enl-
ployment, \\'here voluntanly lea\ tng a JOb reprcs nts reasonable action 
by the employee and 1s conststent \Vith the public interest and (2) to 
ensure equitable treatment to employers 
In determmtng \vhether or not to pa) benefits In particular cases. the 
relevant questions \vould appear to be whether the claimant acted 1n a 
reasonable manner 1n leavmg his job, and \vhether the indhtdual was m 
the labor market and genuinely seeking \\ ork. If the ans\vers to both 
questions are 1n the affirmative benefits can he paid, and \vhen the 
9 Stc Eveline Burn~ Social St.curity and Publfc Policy. New York: ~lcCraw Hill, 
1956, pp. 78-79, 165-171, 184-188, 209-211; Hcm1an Feldman and Donald ~1. 
Smith, The Case for Experience Rating. New York: lndu tnal Relation~ Counselors, 
Inc., 1939 Richard A L~ter and Charles V. Kidd, T/U; Ca~e Against Experienc£ 
Rating ~e v York: Industrial Relation!' Counselors, Inc., 1939. 
10 Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws ~ of January 1, 1958, 
pp 34 37 For a list of states which "nonchargc" in connection with the voluntary 
lea\ mg d15qualification se-e Table C, Appendix. 
31 
termination is not attributable to the employer the general account ra-
ther than a specific employer account can be charged. This, for example, 
is the policy currently being followed in neighboring South Dakota. 
Actually, Iowa already uses the "noncharging'' device where benefits 
are pa1d under the "double affirmative" provisions of the law, and where 
an employee's eligibility is established by combining wage credits 
earned in several states.11 •12 The extension of the ('noncharging'' provi-
sion to cover situations where the employee's voluntary leaving repre-
sented reasonable action would thus provide the logical means of pro-
tecting employer accounts while paymg benefits where consistent with 
the objectives of unemployment insurance and the pubhc interest. 
11. Under the "double affumative" provlSion of the Iowa law, tf the clauns 
deputy and appeal referee both affirm an employee's eligibility, the claimant will 
recelVe benefits despite the fact that the CommissiOn reverses the deputy and referee. 
In such cases, however, the employer's account is not charged 
12 \\'here an employee lacks suffictent Iowa wage credits to establlSh ehgibility, 
he Will be entitled to benef1ts u credits earned in other states, when combined with 
those earned in Iowa, are sufficient to establish eligibility In such cases benefit:, 
prud are not charged to employer accounts 
32 
CHAPTER IV 
Return to Regular Employer 
Section 96.51 b of the Iowa Employment Security law provides that 
when an employee who has been laid off from his ··regular" employment 
seeks temporary employment with another employer he must notify his 
prospective temporary employer of hts Intention to return to his "regular, 
job when it again becomes available, if such retwning is not to result in 
disqualification for a voluntary quit There must be an understanding or 
agreement with the temporary employer at the time of hire as to the 
temporary nature of the employment relationship Where an employer 
in contesting a claim alleges that there was no such understanding, the 
employee must prove With a preponderance of evidence that he told the 
employer he desired temporary employment and was hired on that basis. 
Of the 272 voluntary qutt dtsqualifications in Cedar Rapids, Daven-
port, and Iowa City during the fourth quarter of 1957, 36 or 13 per cent 
mvolved mchVlduals who either did not make the required agreement 
\vith their temporary employers or were not able to prove that they had 
done so. As a result the disqualified claunants lost a total of $14,334 in 
base period benefit credits amounting to 482 weeks of benefits. In addi-
tion 17 of the claimants also had lag or ·post-lag·· credits cancelled, since 
the disquahfying quits took place dunng the lag or "post-lag" penods. 
Of the 36 indiVIduals disqualified 17 did not have sufficient uncan-
celled credits remrunmg in their base penods to establish eligibility in the 
same quarter in which they ftled therr claims In the remaining 19 cases, 
the disqualifying quits took place sufficiently early in the base periods c;o 
that benefit credits \vere snll available. In these cases, however, the dis-
qualifications resulted m reductions of up to 17 weeks of eligibility w1th 
an average reducbon of 10 6 weeks 
Presumably It IS the purpose of th1s proVJston to protect the accounts 
of temporary employers should claimants who did not mfonn the tem-
porary employers of their mtentions later lose their regular jobs and f1le 
claims. An analysts and evaluation of this provision of the law, however, 
involves considerations of equity to employers and employees, Its rela-
tion to the objectives of unemployment insurance, the implications for 
state and national output, and the role of personnel administration in 
relation to unemployment msurance 
From the po1nt of VIew of mdustry, the mdiVldual employee, and the 
economy as a whole, it IS desirable that an employee be engaged in suit-
able productive work rather than remain idle and draw unemployment 
insurance. Indeed, the entire unemployment msurance system and its 
companion employment serv1ce is based on this premise. It is beyond 
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question that an unemployment Insurance program should encourage 
productive employment and discourage idleness. 
One can, of course, raise doubts concemmg the social conduct of an 
e1nployee \vho IS less than frank \\ Ith Ius prospective temporary em-
ployer concerning h1s future employment plans. However, even in 
the extreme case of an employee lying to his employer, one is still led to 
the conclusion that the employee \vanted work badly enough to lie in 
order to obtain It The problem, however, is far more complex than 
merely determining \vhether or not the employee told the truth, or de-
ctdmg whether, in the event the employee was lying, such conduct merits 
the penalty involved tn cancellation of unemployment insurance rights 
A number of considerations must be examined in order for the problem 
to be seen in proper perspective. 
At the time of acceptmg a temporary JOb the employee may in fact not 
kno\v whether, when his former job again becomes available, he will 
leave to accept It. He may feel that if the ne\v job "works out," he may 
stay particularly if the 'vages and \vorking conditions on the two jobs 
are fairly similar, and if he has fe\v vested nghts such as seniority or 
pension credits with his regular employer. 
F1ve of the 36 disqualified claimants frankly admitted that at the time 
of hue they made no commitment to remam permanently with their new 
employers, informing the employers that the} preferred to see how the 
ne\v JObs compared to their regular employment, or \vhether the new 
jobs came up to expectations. Thus, for example, In one of these ca~es 
where the decision to disqualify was appealed, the referee in his decision 
upholding the disqualification stated, 
'Vhen the claimant \Vas hired by Mr he stated that if he 
hked the \Vork better \vith the X Company he \vould remain there 
permanently. The claimant was then hired by the X Company on a 
permanent basis. However, \vhen claimant \vas recalled by the Y 
Company he left his employment with X Company to return to that 
employment. . . Claimant has the burden of proVIng and establish-
Ing hts case by a preponderance of evidence and has failed to meet 
this burden The claimant has failed to sho\v that he \vas hired on a 
temporary basis by the X Company nor did he notify his new em-
ployer, the X Company, that he definitely expected to return to his 
former job. The employer in this case hired the claimant on a perma-
nent and not a temporary basis.1 
Thus, in the above case, an employee who refused to commit himself 
1 Apfeal Tribw1al Dec o 57A-3820-F 1-3-58 Italic!> are the author·s The 
names o the employers and claimant ha\.e not been identified for the reasons indi-
cated m Chapter I. 
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to remaining pennanently on a nc'' JOb bcctlusc he \\ cls uncertam how it 
\VOuld compare to his regular employment \vas nevertheless hired by the 
ne\v employer on \vhat the employer constdered to be a permanent basis 
Because, ho\vever, the claimant decided to return to lus 1egular job upon 
recall ( as he satd he mtght dtn tng the etnplo¥ment intervte\v ), he \vas 
disqualified 
'Vhile all fl\ e emplo) ees decided to return to their regular cmplo) ei s 
upon recall , It 1c; Important to note that thcv did c,o 'vi th no intervening 
unemployment and did not file their claims untillatd off by their regular 
employers some ttme later. It should also be recalled that, under the 
Io,va la,v, an employee 'vho le<n es a temporary joh to return to l11s regu-
lar employer cannot escape dtsqualificatton h) plc,Hling that lus 1 egu-
lar employment IS "better emplovment, even though it may in fact be 
better employment. 
In the absence of a thorough cmplovmcnt intcrvic'" hy the etnployer 
concerning the \VOrker's fu ture plans the' employee may not tnake a 
special point of spellmg out the possibility of hts returning to his regu-
lar employer In fact, in some std.tes, as for example Indiana, Pennsyl-
vania, and Rhode Island. employees 'vho inform interim employers that 
they \vUl return to the1r regular employ<. rs \vhen recalled run the n sk 
of bemg disqualified stnce such action rna ' be interpreted as an attempt 
to avoid bemg hired b) the temporary Cinplo) er. This can result in dis-
qualificabon for refusal of ~uita hle \Vork or a holding that the tndividual 
'"as unavailable for 'vork.2 
In the absence of thorough questH>ning by the cn1ployer is it reahsb c 
to ex-pect an employee genuinelv desinng \vork to volunteer an) tnfor-
mation wluch \VOuld decrea~e hts chances of obtaining \VOrk? Thus, for 
example, the appeal tnbunal 1n one of the Davenport cases studied, 
\vhile dlsqualifying the claimant pointed out in tt<\ decision that al-
though the employee admittedly d id not tell the nc\v employer that he 
sought temporary \vork until recalled by his regular employer, he '"as 
also not asked by the employer \vhether he would return If recalled. 
1 \\1len h1red bv the temporary employer the claimant had stated on hts 
'vntten application the name of hts previous employer, and that he had 
been lrud off because of lack of work The employee, ho,vever, \\as dis ~ 
quahfied because he had not spectfteally informed the employer that 
he sought temporary \\'Ork.3 The case records of t\\'O other claimants \\'ho 
2. For a discu!>sion of this problem ~ee, "Recent Appcab Decbion~-Ciaimant 
Awaiting Recall by Fonner Employer5,· The T ..abor \larkc..1 and Employment Sc 
curity, Sept , 1957, pp. 12-13. Also, The Labor ~\1 arJ..et and Employment Srcurrty, 
Dec., 1957, f· 48. 
3. Appea Tribunal Dec ' o 58A-3887-B, 1-17-58. 
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did not appeal therr disquahhcabons indicate srmilar crrcumstances sur-
roundmg their hrre by temporary employers. 
In attempting to assess the probability of an employee's remaining in 
his omploy, the employer or his interviewer can examine a number of 
factor) \vhich, \vhile not guaranteeing a correct guess, make an intelligent 
and informed guess possible. A competent employment interviewer will 
obtain Information concerning the reason the applicant left his last job, 
his former rate of pay In compan son \VIth that on the job being discussed, 
and the claimant's senionty nghts, and nghts In pension and other fringe 
benefit plans with his previous employer. Based on this and other infor-
mation obtained In the employment Interview, and by possibly also con-
tacting the former employer directly, the employment interviewer will 
make an mformed guess as to whether the applicant is likely to return to 
his former employer \vhen \vork again becomes available. The decision 
to hue or not to hire the applicant IS always made on the basis of such 
mformation, and the employer takes the chance of guessing \vrong, re-
gardless of whether there IS an unemployment insurance program in ex-
Istence or not o unemployment insurance disqualification provision 
can serve as a )ubstitute for good personnel administration and sound 
judgment 
The Issue IS further comphcated by the fact that many employees are 
not hkely to be a\vare that a specific provable understanding with the 
temporary employer IS necessary if he is to be protected against disquali-
fication at a later date For example, of 12 Cedar Rapids' claimants inter-
viewed who \vere disqualified for returning to their regular employers 
without a preVIous agreement 'vith their temporary employers, 9 indi-
cated that they did not kno'v of this requrrement The making of indi-
vidual, specific, provable agreements as to length of employment for 
hourly and most salaried workers is not common practice in American 
Industry- Employees have no precedents for such action and, like most 
inchviduals, are not familiar \VIth the "fine print" provisions of labor leg-
islation unless they have previously had personal experience involving 
these provisions As a result, not knowing that six months or a year later 
they may have to prove the existence of an explicit understanding, em-
ployees who mform therr temporary employers of their past work rec-
ords, senionty n ghts, earnings, and other relevant information assume 
that they have done \vhat Is normally expected of them. Thus, for ex-
ample, one of the disqualified claimants, while admitting that he had 
reached no specific understanding 'vith his temporary employer, pointed 
out in his appeal heanng that he had worked for this same temporary 
employer durmg the winter months for three years, and each spring had 
returned to his regular employer when the latter s construction season 
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began. The claimant contended that smce the temporary employer knev., 
his past employment pattern. but lured htm nonetheless, he had fulfilled 
the requirements of the Employment Security Law. The employer, how-
ever, stated that ((they do not h1re on a ten1porary basis," and the claim-
ant was disqualified and $520 of lus benefit credits canc<?lled.4 
In four other cases \vhere the claimants admitted havmg reached no 
specific understanding \vith their emplove1 s concerning the temporary 
nature of the \vork, the employees \\ere actualh referred to the tem-
porary employers by their regular employers on the da\ of layoff \VIth the 
l"Dowledge and co-operation of the temporary emplo) ers In one of the~e 
cases the en1ployee u.-as znterviewed by the temporary employer in the 
office of the regular employer. The mnplovees behe' ed that under these 
circumstances the temporary employer~ ~hould have lno\vn there \Vas 
a strong possibility of their returning to their regular jobs upon recall. 
All four claimants, ho,vever, \vere disqualified, losing a total of $2,606 1n 
benefit credits amounting to &6 \\ eeks of benefit nght~ 
Of the 36 mchviduals disqualified for leaving temporary employers 
to return to therr regular employers 13 claimed to have mformed the 
employers that they wanted temporary work and \Vere hued on that 
bastS, but \Vere unable to prove it \vith a preponderance of evidence 
Of these 13 IndiVIduals. 11 filed their claims SIX months or more after 
begi.n.nmg work on the temporary job, \Vith all the claimantc; having had 
at least one mtervening job before filing their claims Thus, these indivi-
duals were called upon to provide a preponderance of e' 1dence con-
cemmg oral discussions \vhich took place up to 20 months previously in 
the confiDes of an emplojer·s office, and involving personnel practices 
and legal requirements \\·Ith \vhich they are hkel}' to have been unfa-
miliar. 
It IS, of course. neither possible nor appropriate to make any a priori 
assumptions as to \\ h1ch parties are more likely to be telhng the truth, 
but the difficulties faced by an employee in proving Ius case under these 
circumstances are obVIous From the point of v1e\v of a sound and equit-
able unemployment msurance program, the relevant question \vould 
appear to be haVIng taken temporarv employment rather than remain 
out of work and then returning to his regular employer upon recall, did 
the emplo)ee leave Ius regular employer or subsequent employers under 
conditions \Vhich \vould not JUStify compensating him for his current 
unemployment. The necessity of having to make a decision as to whether 
or not an oral agreement\\. as made a number of months previously. con-
cerning a situation \vhich has nothing \\'hatever to do \Vtth an indiVIdual's 
4. Appeal Tribunal Dec No 58A-3908-T, 1-22-58. 
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current lack of \\ ork, ~~ a cmn ber~ome difficult,' and unnecessary re-
sponsibility to place upon a claims deputy or appeal tribunal. If, as was 
~uggested earher, payment of b0nef1ts under such circumstances were 
not charged to an) mdl\ idual ernployer account, but paid out of a gen~ 
eral ''nonchargmg" account, the temporary employer would not be un~ 
farrly penahzed, the \Yorker would not be penalized for having done that 
which is consistent \Vlth public pohcy and the general welfare, and those 
respons1ble for adm1n1stenng the Ia\\ \\ ould be spared the time-consum-
Ing task of adJudicating such cases. 
For the 36 claimants d1squahf1ed penods rangmg up to 15 months 
elapsed after retum1ng to their regular employers before they actually 
filed their claims, with 19 of the 36 clarmants nhng 6 months or more 
,tfter returnmg to then regular jobs The vast bulk of these mtervening 
time periods \vere ~pent in employ1nent \VIth the claimants, regular or 
~ubsquent employer5 In only one of the 36 cases rud a regular employer 
to 'vhom the employee returned contest a claim, and m only two cases 
dtd subsequent employers f1le protests. 
me of the 36 emplo) ees v. ere e1ther already drawlng unemploy1nent 
benefits or had been certified as elig1ble for benefits at the time they 
accepted their temporary JObs Thus, these 9 inruVIduals specificall) 
gave up benef1b 1n order to accept temporary jobs. There IS no \vay of 
kno,vmg '" hethe1 the di~quahfied claimants would have been able to 
secure other t)pes of tempmai) \vork \Vith employers who \vould not 
have protested theu return to their regular JObs It is highly probable, 
ho,vever, that the nsk of later disqualification \vul tend to discourage 
these and other employees fr01n accepting temporary \vork m the future. 
Of 12 of the employees 1nterv1e\ved, 7 mdicated that In VIe\v of therr 
recent disqualification expenence as a result of having taken temporal) 
employment they \vould be reluctant or hesttant to accept temporary 
\vork \vhile a\vaiting recall. The 36 disqualified claunants worked a total 
of 456 \Veeks on their te·mporary jobs before returning to their regular 
employers. Can Io,va afford to penalize or discourage this type of pro-
ductive employment? 
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CHAPTER V 
Illness or Injury 
As has been indic,tted earher, an md1\'idual who voluntarily leaves lus 
employment \Vlll be rusquahf1ed unless the termination \VaS ''for good 
cause attributable to the employer." One of the more Important personal 
reasons for leav1ng \vork IS disabli1t}. In a recent deciSion, the Iowa 
Supreme Court has held that \vhere the termtnabon IS due to illness or 
chsease drrectl) connected \vith the employment such a leavmg 1s ((ill-
voluntary" and '\vith good cause attributable to the employer., 1 How-
ever, most lilnes~cs or accidents rue of a nonoccupational origin or 
nature, and \Vhere employ(.es have terminated their employment for th1s 
reason, disqualifications have been imposed. 
The basic precedent of disquahf) mg claimants \Vho quit their jobs 
because of rusabilit) \Vas established bv the JO\Va Supreme Court in the 
case of \Volfs t. Iowa Employment () curity Connnissicn and lla1ns ... 
although even before tlus decision the Jo,va Employment Security Com-
miSSion had rendered the blood\ stump case cited in Chapter II. 
The \Volfs Case involved a claunant \\:ho left \\'ork to move to a high 
dry climate to Improve a sinus infection causing catarrh of the eyes, a 
condition for \vhich she previously had been hospitalized. \Vhen her 
<.ase came before the Commission on appeal, the rnajoritv members held 
that she 'vas not to be disqualified for the leaving. The Commission had 
1. Raffety v I u:'l Employment Sc. curity Commission, 247 Iowa 896, 76 N.\V. 2d 
787 ( 1956). Tlus case concerned a claimant who suffered nn injury to hi back 
caused by brcala.nh of the floor in a freight car he was unloading. Upon hi recovery, 
and at his physiCian's advice, he ~ought lighter work with hh employer. \Vhcn such 
work was not offered him, he obtained a lighter job, at more pay, with another em-
ployer, but was laid off for lack of work after five and one-half months. He then 
filed a claim for benefits. Tl1<:. c.l1im deputy, appeal tribunal, anc.l Commis ion dis-
qualified the claimant. The Supreme Court, however, held that the claimant's 
separation from the first job was involuntary," and "with good cause attributable to 
the employer" It also noted that the claimant's action fell within the •'letter and 
spirit" of Subsection (a) of Section 96.5.1. In ruling that there was "gooc.l cause 
attributable to the employer, tl,e court rejected the contention of the employer and 
the Comrrussion that, although the claimant's injury arose out of nnd in tl1e course of 
his employment, it was not attributable to the .. employer." Since this decision \\as 
handed down there have ?ot b~en sufficient ca~cs i?.volving tlus issue to indicate 
clearly how close the relationship between the disability and the employment must 
be in order for the Raffety decision to be applicable. It is likely that where the claun-
ant is eligible for \Vorlanen's Compensation or \\·here the injury was due to em-
ployer noncompliance with a safety code, the Raffety decision will be applied If 
the employee did not apply for Workmen s Compensation or was ineligible or not 
covered under that law the applicability of the Raffety deCISIOn will depend on the 
judgment of the clauns deputies, referees CommtsSion, and the courts in each indi-
vidual case 
2. 244 Iowa 999, 59 N W. 2d 216 ( 1953) . 
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reasoned that the claim,lnt, as a reasonable person and considenng her 
physical condition, had no choice but to leave; that the employment she 
left was not suitable for her; and that her leaving was in no sense volun-
tary but actually Involuntary 
The Commis~Ion had contended that the phra~e good cause attnbut-
able to the employer" has no apphcatlon unless It first appears that a 
leav1ng IS "voluntary.'' In answer, however, the court stated that 
The effect oi the argument IS to read out of the statute the words 
·'attnbutable to the employer" ... The argument amounts to this. 
Han employee has any good cause, even though not attributable to 
Ius employment, for leavmg his \Vork lus act in domg so 1s necessarily 
mvoluntary but if the good cause for leavmg IS attributable to the 
employment such leavmg may be voluntary . . . 
It IS argued claimant IS not among those "unemployed through no 
fault of their O\vn ·· In the sense that she \Vas not blameworthy, culp-
able, or \vrong doubtless she \vas not at fault m connection \Vlth her 
unemployment Ho\vever, JJ oulton v. Iowa En1ployment Security 
Co1nrnzsswn - holds the \vord '1ault" as here used 1s not lirruted to 
~ometh1ng worthy of censure but must be construed as meaning 
fat lure of vohtion. 
Before exammmg the <hsquahl1cations resulbng from quits related to 
illness or inJury it is Important that one preliminary point be clear The 
basic problem does not mvolve the question of \vhether or not an 
mruv"ldual \VhO leaves a JOb because of rusability should receiVe bene-
fits while he ts tncapacitated. Such an milividual IS not able and avail-
able for work and is not m the labor market o state pays unemploy-
ment msurance benefits under such crrcumstances, and for purposes of 
this discussion this is assumed to be sound pubhc policy as far as un-
employment msurance IS concemed.3 Rather, the basic issue IS whether 
or not to ilisquahfy Individuals \vho, havmg left therr jobs because of 
Incapacity, reco\er and re-enter the labor market, but cannot find em-
ployment, or fmd employment but lose 1t at a later date. 
Of the 272 voluntary quit disqualifications, 33 or 12 per cent of the 
total mvolved mdividuals whose voluntary leaving was due to physical 
disability or fear that continuation at the same job would result in illness 
or IDJury. Twenty-one of the claimants left because of physical <hs-
abillhes other than pregnancy, three left because of pregnancy, and 
3. Rhode Island, California, New York, and New Jersey have separate Temporary 
DISability Benefit Laws which pay benefits to individuals disabled because of non-
occupational illness or accident. It is not within the scope of this study to deal with 
the merits of such laws or whether they should be integrated with unemployment 
• msurance. 
40 
rune left because of the behef that the \vork \vas detrimental to therr 
health. The 33 claimants lost a total of $11,690 in base period benefit 
credits as a result of chsqualification, plus varymg amounts of lag and 
"post-lag" credits. For 21 of the claunanls the disqualifications meant 
complete loss of eligibility durmg the quarter, while the remaining 12 
claimants had some benefit credits remainmg aftet disqualification. 
A. Illness or Injury Other Than Pregnancy 
1. Resumption of Work Prior To Filing of Claim 
Of the 21 mdn'lduals dtsquaWi.ed for leaving therr JObs because of 
dtsabilities other than pregnancy, 11 resumed work upon recovery, and 
worked for penods rangmg up to t\velve and one-half months before 
becoming unemployed and filing therr claims For these 11 mchVIduals 
the unemployment \vruch caused them to ftlc their claims \V,ls thus 
unrelated to the loss of employment caused by the disabilities 
TI1ree of the 11 clarmants sought and obtained ne\v JObs upon recovery 
because therr old JObs \Vere unsuitable in the hght of theu physical con-
dition One of these claunants dtd not accept her old JOb on the advtcc of 
her doctor smce 1t ill\ olved a i2-hour \vcck, \vluch was believed to be 
excessive Upon re-entermg the labor market the claimant obtained \vork 
\vith another emplo) er and remained at this nc\v job for 29 wee:ks before 
becoming unemployed and filing her claim. After filing he1 clatm she 
refused an offer of the satne job she had previoush <fuit because of ill-
ness The claims deputy ruled that she \Vas not required to accept this 
job because it \vas unsuitable She \Vas, ho,vever, disqualified under the 
voluntary quit proVlSton for ha\'lng "voluntarily" left this job. Thus, the 
claimant, becommg ill on an unsuitable job, \Vas disqualified ~orne nint" 
and one-half months later for having left the unstutablc job on 'vhich 
she became ill. Tlus disqualification resulted in a loss of $53~) of h ... nefit 
credits A second clrumant left Ius employment to enter the hospital upon 
suffeung an epileptic fit of \vhtch he had a history. Because of the nature 
of Ius 1llness his dnver's hcense \vas re\oked. Upon recovery he secured 
emplovment \VIth a ne\v employer \\'hich did not require driving. This 
employee \vorked for hts ne'v employer and a subsc<Iuent etnployer for 
11 months before filing h1s claim, hut because of lus quit to enter thP 
hospttal almost a year previously, he "as disc1ualified, lo\Ing 4 \veeks 
of benefit rights The third claimant \\as advised by her doctor not to 
return to her previous 'vork because he believed the congestion in her 
lungs \vas due to \Vorlang with lint. The claimant secured another job a 
soon as she was able to work 
Four of the remaining eight claimants secured work with ne'' employ-
ers after recovering because their old jobs \vere no longer available, and 
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t\VO employee~ accepted ne\\ JObs for personal reasons. In the case of the 
tenth and eleventh clatmants, the employments which the employees 
left upon becom1ng Ill were part-time supplementary JObs which they 
held concurrently with their regular full-time positions. Upon recovery, 
the clatmants resumed their regular full-time jobs but were disqualified 
because they had not also resumed the supplementary employment. In 
one mstance the claimant's doctor advised against the supplementary 
employment while m the other case the employee had been replaced. 
These hvo disquahf1cations resulted 1n cancellation of those credits 
earned on the supplementary JObs. 
2. Unemployment Follo\ving Recovery 
Ten of the 21 claimants disqualified for voluntarily leaving their jobs 
because of disability other than pregnancy \Vere unable to secure em-
ployment upon re-entering the labor market, and filed claims for bene-
fits Tvlo of these reported back to therr former employers, and although 
able and available for \VOrk, were unable to perform the specific tasks at 
\Vh1ch they were preVIOUsly engaged because of their phys1cal conrution. 
The employers, however, had no work which the claimants were able to 
perform, and the employees sought unsuccessfully to find other work 4 
Three other employees did not report back to their preVIous employers 
because they believed therr physical condition \vould not perrmt them to 
carry out their former work. For example, one of these claimants who 
had been driving a truck for a transportation company had to surrender 
his chauffeur's hcense because of ills illness. 
Four of the ten employees had not secured leaves of absence upon 
becoming ill, and v.'hen they reported back to therr employer after 
recovering found either that \vork \vas unavailable because of a slack m 
employment, or that they had been replaced In one of these cases, the 
employee reported back to his employer but found that no work was 
available, and filed h1s clatm two weeks later. One week after filmg his 
clarm he was recalled, and worked for hvo weeks. This claunant, how-
ever, \vas disquahfied because of his illness quit, despite the fact that he 
had returned to work for the same employer when work became avail-
able5 
In the tenth case the employee filed a claim for benefits upon being 
laid off from a construction job. He \Vas certified as eligible for benefits, 
but before drawing his first check secured another job which involved 
4 One of these cases was appealed, but the deputy's decision to disqualify was 
upheld by both the referee and the Commission. Appeal Tribunal Dec. No 58-
A-3915-T, 1-23-58. Commission Dec. No. 58C-2649, 2-21-58. 
5. Appeal Tribunal Dec. No. 58A-3907-T, 1-23-58. 
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tnside work. He\.\ or ked at tlus latter position for two and one-half days 
and quit because of illness. At his appeal hearing the claunant testi£1ed 
that he dtd not \vant to continue filing for unemployment benefits and 
had taken the tnside "ork despite the fact that he had suffered from a 
lung aliment for the past fow· years and had been adv1sed not to accept 
inside employment because of it. The claimant admitted that the JOb 
"as not rrusrepresented to him by the employer, that he \vas not em-
ployed on a tnal basts, and that he had not told the employer about Ius 
all.ment when lured. He \vas doing brush patnb.ng and some grmdmg, 
and after two and one-half da} s "as unable to continue 'vork because of 
his physical cond1t1on.6 Thus, tlus claimant, although certuted and eli-
gJ.ble for unemployment benefits took an unsuitable job rather than dra'v 
benefits Tlus h\·o and one-half day effort to \vork, ho,vever, co5t him lus 
ehgJ.bility and $372 in benefit credits 
It IS clear that In the case of 'olunt,uy quits due to non-occupational 
disability such leaving cannot be attributed to the employer. At the same 
time, ho,ve\ er, can a leaving caused by an illness be considered volun-
tary in any realistic sense? As has been pointed out in numerous cases 
arismg in other states ( mcludmg those \vith an "attnbutable to the em-
ployer" clause ), an employee 'vho 1s 1ll or injured has no reasonable 
altemab.ve but to cease \Vorking until he recovers 7 ~either the employer, 
the employee, or the community gains \\fhen an tndn I dual continues at 
\vork \vhile disabled. 
Illness or accident results not only in a loss of regular earnings, but in 
adrubon usually involves expen~es for medical care. YVhere indn 1duals 
are able and available for \Vork and m,1kc a smcere effort to find work 
after recovef} can one JUStify the 1mposttlon of the additional penalt; 
mvolved m cancellation of pre\ Ioush earned benefit credits and denial 
of benefits? ~Ioreover, as 11 claimants discovered, under the present la'v 
a voluntary quit because of illness can result in such a penalty months 
after the individual actually returned to \vork. 
B. Leaving Because of Pregnancy 
From the ~tandpoint of an individuars physical ability to \\'ork, a 
claimant who lea\ es her job because of pregnancy is no different frorn 
one \vho qu1ts because of some other incapacitating condttion. .\ ~ 
mrucated earher, the relevant question iS not \Vhether benefttS should be 
paid during periods unmcdiately preceding or follo\ving dehvcf}, but 
rather, \vhether the fact of having c1uit because of pregnane) IS suff1c1ent 
6 Appeal Tribunal Dec o 58A-3883-B, 1-17-58. 
7 See Chapter II . 
grounds, per se, for d1squalifymg such claimants If, after re-entering the 
labor market and makmg a genuine effort to obtain \VOrk they are unable 
to do so 
It IS common kno,vledge that at the present time large numbers of 
young mothers \vork desp1te family obligations. Re-entry mto the labor 
market fairly soon after childbrrth causes no surpnses in twentieth cen-
tury America. Since it is a safe assumption that motherhood is a state 
\vhich IS to be encouraged rather than discouraged, it goes without 
saymg that there are no social or pubhc policy grounds for disqualifying 
a claimant because g1VIng birth forced her to quit her JOb. Rather, the 
problem IS one of administration. That IS, determming \vhether such a 
claimant is or 1s not genuinely m the labor market. If she 1s not, then, as 
is true of all other non-labor market participants, benefits should not be 
paid If the clarmant IS making a sincere effort to obtam work, can one 
JUsbfy refusal of benefits? In either case, can one JUStify cancellation of 
credits? Smce cancellation of previously earned benefit credits is in fact 
a penalty, does not such a policy mean that an employee is puniShed for 
havmg committed the act of bearmg a child? 
Three of the 33 claimants \Vere disqualified for voluntary quits due to 
pregnancy. One of the claimants resumed work with a new employer in 
the quarter Immediately follo\vmg that In ' vhich she left her previous 
JOb . H er preVlous (•mployer had secured a replacement, and she worked 
for her ne\v employer and a subsequent employer for a period extending 
from the fourth quarter of 1956 unbl ovember 8, 1957, when she was 
laid off. Her disqualification resulted In cancellation of the benefit rights 
earned prior to her pregnancy quit. As concerns the other two claimants, 
the case records sho,ved no employment durmg the periods between the 
dates they left their employment and the dates they filed their claims 
Information is not a\ a1lable concemmg their labor market status on the 
dates they filed thetr claims, but m the event these clarmants were not 
genuinely seeking work, the able and available requirement Itself would 
have prevented the payment of benefits without the necessity of im-
posing voluntary quit disqualifications and cancelling credits. 
C Leavzng Because of Risk of Illness or Injury 
:\me of the 33 claunants left theu jobs because they feared that con-
tmuation at \vork \Vould endanger therr health. Two of these were 
employees \vho left supplementary part-hme jobs because they felt that 
continuing at \Vork on two jobs \vould be injurious. Both employees 
continued at their regular full-time jobs without interruption for periods 
of three and nine months before being laid off and filing their claims for 
benefits. Although both etnployees \vere disqualified for quitting their 
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upplementary jobs, the cancellation of credits earned on these jobs dtd 
not affect their benefit nghts since both employees had already earned 
the maximum an1ount of credit on their regular jobs 
Of the remaining seven emplo) ees, five secured \vork subsequent to 
their leaVIng. and did not file their claims until laid off from their 
ubsequent JObs. One of these claimants had quit his JOb because he 
feared the heavy hfting \vould aggravate a back Injury for which he had 
been hospitalized SlX months prC\1.0usly, \vhile ,\ second felt that the 
cement dust'' ,l.s begmning to affect Ius health and no dust-free positions 
"ere available. A third claimant quit his job because the long hour<; 
'vere adversely affectmg his health, and in a fourth case the employee 
left because the \vork was aggravatmg a shoulder muscle. The fifth 
claimant left a foundry JOb after" or king one da) because the gas and 
fumes made him ill and dizZ} ·\s noted above, these five individuals did 
not file claims upon quittrng their JObs, but rather secured other "ork 
and remained at such subsequent 'vork for periods ranging up to 2<3 
\veeks before be1ng laid off and then filmg for benefits. 
In the final t\\ o cases the employees \vere unable to secure other cnl-
ployment after quittmg Penods of seven and ten \veek5 elapsed ho\v-
ever, before they filed their clauns 
It IS true, of course, that an unemployment Insurance progran1 must 
be protected against the efforts \\'hich some employees may make to use 
.. fear of illnessH as a means of obtaining a paid \'acahon at the expense of 
the program Again, however, preventing such abuse IS primarily a prob-
lem of administration. Whether a JOb actually involves a risk to a particu-
lar employee's health IS a medical question requuing IndiVIdual detenni-
nation. If it is suspected that an employee IS merely usmg tlus as an 
excuse to dra\v unemployment In<iurance, an effort needs to be made to 
establish this. '''here malingenng JS evident the employee should be 
disqualified because he quit \Vtthout good cause Ho,vever, under the 
present la\\ , the ments of the employee's claim are rrrelevant if the 
employer him~elf IS not at fault, and disquahficahon Is automatic 
It goes without saymg that health IS a matter of the utmost Importance 
not only to the IndiVIdual, but to the commun1tv ,ls a \vhole. To auto-
matically penahze an emplovee by cancelling his benefit credits \vhen 
he may have taken the only posstble intelligent course of action 1s to jeo-
pardize the state's most Important asset-Its human resources. To the 
emp1oyee 'vho ts fearful that his present job is phystcally harmful the 
Employment Secunty Act in effect says, "You had better not quit, since 
even if you immediately obtain another JOb, you \\ 11l lose a significant 
portion of your benefit rights if you are laid off from ) our ne\v JOb SIX 
months or more from now •• 
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In seven of the nine cases diScussed above, the fact that the employees 
obtamed new JObs after the quit without filing claims is strong evidence 
that therr concern for their health was sincere. In the remaining two 
casPs where the employees did not obtain new employment before fihng 
theJI claims, the fact that they did not file until seven and ten weeks after 
quitting prov1des at least some evidence that their quits were not mob-
vated by a desire to draw vacation pay in the fonn of unemployment 
Insurance. 
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CHAPTER VI 
Domestic Circumstances 
Among the various reasons for leaving one's employment are those 
\vhich come under the broad category of \vhat might be termed "do-
mestic circumstances" Included under tlus descnption \vould be Cir-
cumstances such as leaving \vork because of havmg to care for children, 
illness or death of others, housing or household duties, marriage, or the 
movmg of one's spouse to another locality As \vas pomted out in the 
discussion of personal illness or injury, unemployment benefits are not 
and should not be paid as long as the domestic circumstances keep the 
indiVIdual out of the labor marl.et. Of concern here Is the question of 
pohcy relating to individuals \\ ho have returned to the labor market 
and are actively seeking'" ork 
\Vhere the domestic Circumstances CclUSing an individual to leave his 
job are not attnbutable to the emplo) cr, the Io,va hnv requires disquali-
fication in all cases except for one narro,vly prescribed type of situation. 
Thts 1s where an Indtvidualleaves lus employment, 
for the necessary and ~ole purpose of taking care of a member of his 
immediate famtly "ho '' ~1s then InJured or ill, and if after said mem-
ber of Ius familj sufficienth recovered he immediately returned to 
and offered hts services to h1s employer, provided, hO\\ ever. that dur-
Ing such penod he d1d not accept any other employment. 
Leaving becau<-e of any other type of domestic circumstance results 
in rusquahftcabon and cancellation of all previously earned credits 
irrespective of the claimant\ succeeding labor market partictpation or 
employment record. Even the one exception involving care of a famih 
member has been very narro,vly interpreted in the p~1st bv prior com-
miSSions For example, the \vord "family" in this pro\,SIOn has been 
stnctly Interpreted to mean a collective hod} of persons \vho form one 
household under one head and one domestic government. Thus, a cook 
'"ho obtained a leave of absenc ~ to \ISit a critically ill daughter in 
another state did not return to '''ork because her daughter died and sh • 
'"·anted to remain to care for her three grandchildren he \vas held not 
to have left to care for a sick member of her immediate "famtly:' smce 
her daughter \\as not a member of her immediate family as defined 
above She\\ as disqualified for t}u<; reason and also because she did not 
apply for relure.1 
1 Commission Dec ~o 56C-2221, 3-21-56, BSSt I~ VL-155.35-23. 
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~ven though an tndh Idual has left to care for a member of his im-
rnediate famil} , he IS not excepted from disqualification under this pro-
VIsion unless he I eturns and offers his services to his employer. Thus, a 
claimant \vas disqualified when she quil to care for her seriously ill 
husband and dtd not apply for re-employment after his recovery because 
the famtly had moved to a ne\v locality during Ius Illness 2 In another 
case a claimant did re-apply to her Immediate supervisor and was told 
the shift had been discontmued The employer said she should have 
,tpphed at the ctnployment department at Jus establishment as no super-
VISOr had authonty to hire. She \vas disqualified 3 
Dunng the fourth quarter of 1957, 11 claimants from the three labor 
1narkets studied \vere disqualified for havtng left their employment for 
reasons which \vould appear to come under the heading of domestic 
cu:cumstances Of these, t\vo \vere actually rehrred by the employers 
\vhom they had left In one of these cases the claimant had left work to 
be with a marned daughter \vho was ill m another state. He was rehired 
by his employer 3 weeks later and ·worked for an additional 23 weeks 
before bemg laid off and fthng a claim He \vas disqualified, however, 
and lost $562 In benefit credits because he had not secured a leave of 
<tbsence, despite the fact that he returned to \vork for the same employer. 
The second claimant left her JOb on October 12, 1956, because she was 
unable to obtain a baby Sitter. She returned to work for the same em-
ployer in May, 1957, and worked for this employer for approximately 22 
\veeks unbl October 24, 1957, \vhen she \Vas laid off She filed her claim 
one \veek later, but \Vas disqualified for the quit 'vhich had occurred one 
year earlier, losing $215 in benefit credits. 
A third claunant had left his employment m Ames, Iowa, on August, 
15, 1957, to return to the Davenport area to be near his mother who was 
to undergo surgery. The claimant had not secured a leave of absence, 
and adm1tted to the clarms taker that his mother's surgery did not require 
his presence and he merely \vanted to be near her. He filed an original 
claim for benefits in Davenport on August 20, 1957, but before the 
claim could be adjudicated he secured a job in the Davenport area and 
\VOrked until 0:ovember 15, 1957, before filing an additional claim. On 
December 2, 1957, he was disqualified because of his quit from the 
Ames employer on August 15, resulting in a loss of $177 in benefit 
credit 
Two of the ten claunants left theu jobs becnuse theu spouses had been 
2. Appeal Tnbunal Dec. Nos. 56A-1576-B and 58A-1577 -B 6-8-56 
3. Appeal Tribunal Dec No 58A-2064-T. 10-26-56. 
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transferred to other ,ueas of the state One of these left her JOb in Stoux 
City on August 13, 195i, because she moved to Davenport \.Vtth her hus-
band The employee had obtained a lea\e of ab<ience from her Sioux 
Ctty emplo: e1 so that she might rece1ve consideration for a transfer to 
hts Davenport store. The Davenport branch of the company, however, 
had no openings and she filed a claim on October 13, 1957. The claimant 
\\as disqualified because of the Stoux City qutt, losmg all of her previ-
ously earned credits some $682.4 The second clatmant left her job on 
April 26, 1957, to be married, and moved to another city. She obtamed 
employment in her ne\v locality on July 15, 1957 and worked until 
October 18, 1957 \'v hen she \vas laid off Th1s cla1mant filed her original 
clarm on October 2L 1957, but \vas disqualified for the quit necessitated 
bv her marriage, losing 23 \veeks of benefit rights 5 
One clatmant left his JOb Intending to visit lus mother in Austria upon 
leammg that Ius father had JUSt died there. The claimant left for Chicago 
,\,thout being gtven a leave of absence by his employer, but \vas unable 
to obtain a passport and retUrned to Davenport. He obtained work with 
a ne\\ employer upon returning and worked for 34 \Veeks before being 
la1d off and filing h1s claim. The quit 34 \\ eek<i preVIously, however 
resulted m diSCJUalificabon. 
Of the five remaining claimants \vho left their jobs because of domes-
be problems three <iubsequently secured other \vork before filing their 
claims "bile the l,1st nvo \vcre unable to obtain \vork upon re-entering 
the labor market and filed their claims One of these had not reported 
back to work at the expiration of her authonzed leave of absence 
because of her Inabihh to find a babv sitter. This claimant was Inter-
" 
view approximately four months after f1lmg her claim and had a yet 
been unable to find \vork despite the efforts of the United States Em-
ployment Service, to \vhom she reported on a number of occasionc; after 
disqualification. It might be noted that the claimant \vas a veteran and 
at the time of intervie\\ \\as 1 ecciving unemployment benefits under the 
Veterans' ReadJustment Act This \vould tend to support her statement 
that she \\as current!) in the labor market and seeking \vor~, smcc in 
order to dra\\ benefits under th Veteran~' program the clatmant must 
4 Appeals Tribunal Case. o 57A-3684-B-T. 12-2-57 The appeal referee in this 
case pointed out that he had no choice but to disqualify the clrumant in view of the 
precedent estabhshed in the case of Fairfield Glove Co v. Iowa Employment 
Security Commission and Eunice Ruggels ( Distnct Court for Jefferson County, 11-
13-52, CCH, Vol 3, par 8111.) In thts case, the court held that under the Iowa )av. 
a woman who leaves her job to mo\ e with her husband to another locality mu~ ht. 
chsqua.lified because her leaving w~ not for cause attnbutable to the employer. 
5. Appeals Tribunal Dec . o 57 A-3725-F, 12-9-57 
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meet the same tests of availability for work and work seeking effort as 
state claimants. 6 
The classuication "domesbc circumstances" covers a w1de range of 
possible Individual Situations. It is not possible here to d1scuss in any 
detml crrcumstances under wluch a claimant IS or IS not just:ibed in 
lea\ 1ng a JOb. 1v1any of the considerations which determme a cla1mant's 
actions are subJCCbve and are uruque to that indiVIdual. In states wluch 
tecognize good personal cause for leavmg work, the claiDls examiner 
must look at all the facts, obJeCtive and subjectlve, \veigh them carefully 
in terms of \vhether or not the claimant acted as a reasonable or prudent 
person might, and reach h1s deciSIOn accordmgly In Io\va, however, the 
la\v arbitranl) rules out all possible domestic circumstances not attribut-
able to the employer except the one noted earher, and It is d.i.fficult to 
conceive of a domestic Circumstance w h1ch would be attributable to the 
employer. 
It IS vital that unemployment Insurance funds be protected agamst 
indiVIduals \vho might "invent" domestic crrcumstances m order to dra-w 
benefits to \vhich they are not entitled. This protective function, how-
ever, must be performed by those whose responsibility it is to detemune 
\\>hether the mdividual's leavmg was for good cause and whether he IS 
actually mahng a genuine effort to fmd \vork once domestic crrcum-
stances no longer keep him out of the labor market. A problem which IS 
essentially administrative IS not hkely to be solved satisfactorily through 
a broad legislatl\ e proVIsion or JUdicial decision wluch applies arbi-
tranly to man} Individual situations, each of whose uniqueness reqwres 
tndtviduai consideration. 
It IS tmportant to note that of the 11 claimants In tlus category who 
\vere disqualified 8 dJd obtain \vork after the domestic crrcumstances 
\\ere no longer a barner to employment, and did not seek unemployment 
Insurance until In\ oluntarily losmg therr subsequent jobs for non-
disquahnable reasons unrelated to the domestic crrcumstances Where, 
as 1n these 8 cases, the records show that the claimants did work after the 
domestic crrcumstances were no longer present, It cannot be claimed that 
6. At the time of her dt~quahficabon under the state program the claimant had 
abo been <hsqualified for a \Oluntary quit under the Veterans' Readjustment Act 
smce under the Veterans' program the claimant is subject to the same eligibility and 
du;quahficabon proviSIOns as are indiVIduals under the state program, except that 
under the Veterans' Readjustment Act wage credits cannot be cancelled. In the 
.1bove case, the claimant's disqualifiCation for a voluntary quit under the Veterans 
program resulted m a postponement of benefits for two weeks, after which she began 
receiVIng benefits Had she been unavailable for work she '' ould not have beer. 
eligible for beneftts und<.:r the Veterans' program 
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the mdiVIduals used domestic circumstances as an excuse to obtain a 
pa1d vacation. 
Ideally, employees who must leave work temporanly should obtain a 
leave of absence. Employees, ho\vever, may not think to do so, may be 
unfarmhar \Vlth the practlce, and may not reahze the unportance of 
domg so. Employers, on the other hand, may not have a pohcy of grant-
ing lea\es may be hesitant to commit themselves, or may actually be 
glad to see an employee leave \VIthout having to frre him. An efficient 
pohcy and procedure for requesung and granting lea\ es of absence are 
fundamental to a sound personnel relations program and progressive 
employ<. rs mterested in developing the best in personnel and human 
relations practices are contmuously seeking to impro\ e their procedures 
for rc asr ns quite Independent of the particular relation to unemployment 
insurance. It IS questionable, ho,vever, \vhether imperfections in such 
procedures regardless of '"'hether due to the employee or employer, 
should be permitted to influence the receipt of benefits zn case'i where 
the conduct of ernployers in leaving employment zs nezther znconszstent 
with good social conduct generally nor the objectzues of unemployment 
msurance zn particular. 
\Vhere an employer may have been '''illing to grant a leave of absence 
had one been requested, his objection to having his unemployment 
benefit account charged IS understandable, just as 1s his complaint that 
he had nothing to do \Vlth creating the domc.stic crrcumstance itself. As 
has been pointed out earlier, ho,vever, such objections can be satisfied 
through the device of the "noncharging" account 'vithout denymg bene-
fits to individuals \vhose conduct \vould not generally be subject to social 
disapprovaL 
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CHAPTER VII 
Leaving To Attend School 
\ \ 7hene\ er ,1ttendance at school removes an mchv1dual from the labor 
fen ce it IS cleat that he cannot quahfy for benefits because of the "able 
and ,t \ atlable'' requuement. There can be little quarrel wtth this pohcy. 
The pt oblem dtscussed tn tills chapter relates to the application of the 
uolttntory quzt ptovtston to mdividuals \vho voluntarily leave their JObs 
to enter, rematn 1n, 01 1c-enter school. vVhether to use the "able or avail-
able .. pro' Iston or tlw voluntary quit provision to protect unemployment 
111~urance funds undet ~uch circumstances IS not an academtc question. 
voluntar) quit d1squahftcat1on In Iowa, unhke a "not able or available" 
decision , results In cancellation of previously earned benefit rights 
The problem of dtsqualification pohcy in relabon to individuals who 
voluntan l) quit thetr JObs m order to attend school, while mvolving only 
four claimants 1n the three labor mar~ets stuched , IS rmportant in the 
"t)nse that it ratses questions of a most baste nature concerning the con-
s•stenc) of the Io'' a la\\' with the objectives of unemployment insurance 
and the general \velfare of the community as a whole. 
5Ince one cannot be In two places a t the same b.me, it follows that an 
ernplo) ee des1rmg to attend school must qrut a JOb \vluch requires his 
presence durmg the hours school1s 1n sess1on . Under the present law this 
means that tf durtng the 18 months follo\vmg such a qutt the mdividual 
completes hts education or leaves school for some other reason, re-enters 
the labor market, cannot fmd work and files a clarm, his preVIously 
earned beneftt n ghts \vill be cancelled Thus, for example, one of the 
claunants had quit hts JOb in September 1956 to enter school. In Sep-
tember, 1957 he re-entered the labor market, secured employment, and 
'' or:ked for clppro:\.tmately a month "hen he was laid off Upon fihng a 
chum for benefi ts on ~O\ ember 15 1957, he was d1squahfied for the 
qu1t of 14 months ear her \\ Ith a cancellation of the $200 in benefit 
credits earned pno1 to September 1956. 
In the above cuse the employee dtd not attempt to obtain benefits 
\vhile in school, but tnstead re-entered the labor force and secured work, 
and later became unemployed for reasons unrelated to the fact that he 
had quit a job months previously to enter school. The question \vhich 
tlus case ra1ses 1s \vhether the act of furthering one's education merits 
the penalty of denial of benefits and cancellation of wage credits. 
A second claimant apphed for benefits \vhen he \Vas enrolled in school 
on a half-time basts, and really \\ as not m the labor market at the time 
he filed hts cla1m. IIe had quit a JOb 16 months preVIously to enter school 
and \\ as disqualified for this qutt. Thts claimant \Vas not entitled to 
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benef1ts because he \\'as not In the labor market. Could not the claimant 
have been dented benefits on tlus ground, making unnecessary the can-
cellation of $200 of bene&t credtts whtch h,1d been earned over 16 
months earlier? 
Where an mdivtdual devotes lu~ ttn1e cluefly to Ius ~tudies, with Ius 
einployment being only incidental, he cannot obtain beneftts should h ~ 
lose Ius job, smce such incidental unemployment IS not covered under 
the la\v. Consider, ho\vever, the individual \vho \vorks full time and alc;o 
attends school full time. If such an e1nployee quits h1s JOb because 1t 
conflicts \\ Ith Ius class schedule, I~ unable to find another JOb \VIth con-
\ entent hour~ and files a cld.im, It IS p1obable that the employee·s re-
~ervabon of certa1n hours for school attendance constitutes eXIt from the 
labor force. If It IS evtdent that an employee cannot hope to ftnd employ-
ment during hts non-school hours because such \VOrk does not eu st, the 
claunant can be held to be unavatlable for \vork and beneftts dented. It 
IS qutte another matter, ho\\ ever to impose a voluntary quit dtsqualifi-
cat.Ion and cancel the tndtviduals picviously earned benefit rights. Thu~ 
m the third case the claimant had worked full time as a drill press 
operator on the second shift of a compan) for three years until Octobei 
22, 1957. During tlus same pen od he " as a full-time student at Cornell 
College except for the summer of 1956 \vhen he worked full time for the 
employer. On October 22. 1957, there '' as d reduction in force on tl1e 
second shift, but because of the claimant ~ seniority, the employer 
offered lum the same type of \vork on tl1e frrst shift. The claimant \\ a~ 
in hts senior year as a full-time student at Cornell College and because 
of hiS school \vork. could not accept transfer to the frrst sluft.1 
The fourth case, which \vas similar, involved a claimant '' ho had 
''or ked over four years for the same company. During much of this 
time he \\. as a full-time student at the Palmer School of Chiropractic and 
'" orked on the second sruft while attending school Al the time of his 
separation the \vork on the second sluft ' ' as being curtailed, and the 
claimant \Vas told he vvould have to transfer to the fust sh1ft. lie did not 
accept the transfer because he \\'as in h i5 senior year m school and did 
not \vant to qwt ills school \vork at this tune to continue v: ith his job, 
although on hvo other occasions he had quit school to accept a transfer 
to another sillft.2 
The facts chsclosed in these last t\vo cases indicate that the claimants 
\vere restricting their availability to the second shut. Tlus might ' "'ell 
have resulted in their being held unavailable for \Vork, and benefits 
1. Appeal Tribunal Dec No 57 A-3779-B, 1-3-58. 
2 Appeal Tribunal Dec. No. 58A-3885-B, 1-17-58. 
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dented on tlus ground w1thout cancelhng their credits. Instead, under 
the present la\v the claunants were chsquah.hed for voluntary quits and 
each had $720 in benefit nghts cancelled. Does an mdiVldual who has 
worked full time \vlule attending college and then must cease working 
1n order to frmsh h1s education deserve th1s type of treatment? Can Iowa 
afford thus to penalize its young people for seeking to unprove their 
education? 
Recent events of \vorld-\vide significance have underscored the Im-
portance of Improving the education of our population. While only a 
small number of individuals in the three labor markets \vere dlsquahfied 
for having quit \vork to return to school, a number of factors are m 
operation \vhich are hkely to mcrease the frequency with wluch such 
cases anse m the fuhrrc Recognition of the importance of education 1s 
gro\vmg, 1ncreas1ng numbers of individuals are completmg high school 
and entermg college, and the costs of higher education are nsing, with 
the result that rnore and more students may have to \vork part time or 
full orne \vhile attending school, or may have to interrupt their schooling 
periodically in order to replenish their finances. Does a social msurance 
program which makes more difficult the efforts of mruvlduals to improve 
therr education and skills serYe the best Interests of the state and nation? 
\Vhere individuals have left the labor force to attend school, den1al of 
benefits on the ground that such individuals are una\ aliable for work lS 
consistent with the objectives of unemployment msurance. It 1s diliicult 
to understand \vhat purpose IS served by rmposmg a voluntary quit 
dic;cluahfication and cancelling preVIously earned benefit rights. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
Employee Di satisfaction 
In preVIous sections of this study, five broad categones of reasons for 
leaving work \\ere discussed InvolVIng some 113 disqualilicatlons. The 
remaining 159 cases \vhtch do not fall w1thin these five categones 
mvolved individuals \vho either quit because of personal dissatisfaction 
of one kmd or another\\ 1thout ha'\'lng ,1 definite offer of a ne\v JOb, or 
contended that they had been discharged and had not quit, but \vere 
unable to prove their contention. 
As concerns mdiVIduals who voluntarily leave their jobs for "better" 
employment or to return to their regular employers upon recall, who quit 
because of ill health or serious domestic problems, or to return to school, 
the author behe\ es that soc1et) \Vlll generally consider such quits to be 
reasonable and consistent \VIth the general welfare. It 1s less clear, how-
ever \\hether unemployment'' htch IS initiated by quits because of dis 
absfaction \Vith \\ages hours, ~vorking conditions, or other factors will 
be considered compensable unemployment by the community Un-
employment msurance must not be used to aid those \Vhose lack of \VOrk 
IS the result of thetr O\vn arbitrary action Only \vhen the indiVIdual's 
unemployment IS due to action \Vhich society considers prudent and 
reasonable m the hght of the particular Circumstances can payment of 
benefits be JUStified 
\V1thm thts context, the present Iowa la\v as 1t <lpphes to claimants 
\vho leave their jobs because of personal dissatisfaction rruses three ques-
tions of fundamental importance The fust IS 'vhether the proVIsion 
requmng a termination to be ~·attnbutable to the employer" IS the 
appropnate means of pre\enting payment of benefits for unemployment 
,,_,hich IS the result of an arbitrary or unreasonable quit. 
Secondly, assuming that a quit" as arbitrary and unreasonable, IS tills 
sufficient reason for disquahficat.Ion 1f the IndiVIdual \Vorked at another 
JOb followzng lus quit and before fihng his claim? That IS, a s1tuat1on m 
'vhich the unemployment for "" hich the tndivtdual is clairntng ben efts Is 
unrelated to hts quit, but is due, rather to the inability of the current 
labor market to provide suttable \\·ork~ 
The third questlon In\olves the nature of the dtsquahfiCation penalty 
Its lf. 
A. The UAttributable to the Employer Clause 
The 159 dtsqualifications not falhng within the categones discussed 
in Chapters III through VII involved IndiVIduals who either left therr 
jobs for a vanety of reasons which might be grouped in the broad cate-
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gory of "employee dissatisfaction," or claimed that they had been <hs-
charged rather than having quit. As can be seen in Table 4, five inch-
\'lduals qutt their JObs to enter self-employment and later resumed the 
status of employees. In s1x cases the employees felt the transportation 
£acuities to the job were inadequate or that the travel-time to the JOb was 
excesstve. 1neteen Individuals quit because they thought the wages 
were unsatisfactory, and five quit because of dissatisfaction with the 
hours In se\ en teen cases the employees left theu JObs because they felt 
the nature of the work made it unsuitable, while twenty-six chsqualifica-
tlons resulted from qutts because of dissatisfacbon with the working con-
ditions. In the latter cases, the dissatisfaction stemmed from such factors 
as temperature, sanitation , dislike of fellow employees or supervisor, 
safety, weather, and others Seven employees left theu JObs because 
they believed a layoff was nnminent, while ten employees thought they 
had good prospects for better jobs which, however, did not materialize 
unmediately Forty-two quits mvolved a variety of other reasons. The 
fmal twenty-two cases involved the question of whether the employees 
had quit or \vere discharged These cases usually arose in situab.ons 
\vhere the employees had been absent from work without notifying the 
employers. The employers contended that the employees had quit, and 
the employees claimed they had returned to work, but \vere discharged 
upon returning or pnor to their return. In each of the above cases the 
employee was unable to establish that the unauthorized absence itself 
did not constitute a break m the employment relaoonslup. 
It is neither feasible nor appropriate for the author to discuss each of 
the 159 cases and reach a conclusion as to \vhether the particular chssab.s-
facnon m each case JUStified the voluntary quit, or whether the employee 
did In fact qu1t or \vas discharged A careful study of the case histories 
of the 159 dtsqualificanons does, however, indicate that there are strong 
grounds for questioning the desirabtlity of so inflexible a policy as that 
\vhich results from the requirement that a quit must have been ((attribut-
able to the employer" in order for the claimant to avoid disqualification 
~fany of the claimants would doubtless have been disqualified even 
tn those states \Vhtch have a liberally Interpreted "good cause" pro-
vision. As it has been interpreted, however, the Iowa law rules out by 
definihon all possible quits based on personal employee dissatisfaction, 
\vith the reason for, or degree of dissatisfaction being irrelevant as con-
cerns the decision \vhether or not to disqualify. As a result, claimants 
\vhose actions may be arbitrary and irresponsible are lumped together 
\vith indiVIduals whose reasons for leaving would stand a good chance 
of receiving social approval. Thus, for example, in one case, a single 
\voman aged 45 with hvo partially dependent parents had been em-
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ployed for 14 years as a shoe clerk In a department store. She lost her 
JOb \vithout warning \vhen the shoe depat linent was taken over by a new 
management. The claunant applied for unemployment insurance and 
dre\\· benefits for four\\ eeks before secunng a JOb as a clerk In a retail 
bakery. She was unprepared, ho\vever, for this type of clerkmg, and feel -
ing herself unable to cope with the pressures of \vaitmg on large numbers 
of customers In rapid succession, mvolving products and procedures with 
\\ hich she \\as unfamiliar left after one day Tlus resulted in disquahfi-
non, with a consequent loss of ehgibihty, and cancellation of $445 m 
previously earned beneftt credits. 
Another claunant \Vho had been laid off from Ius regular job filed d 
claim and" as certified as eligible for beneftts Before receiving his frrst 
check he accepted a temporary job in a foundry. The employee found 
however, that he could not adjust to the 100-110° ten1perature in this 
\vork, and qutt on Jul) 30, 1957, after\\ orkmg one day. He immediately 
obtained another temporary JOb. and a short time later accepted recall 
to his regular employment He \vas agatn laid off by his regular employer 
on ovember 4, 1957, and ftled another clatm. He \vas then disqualified 
because of h1s quit of July 30 This resulted in cancellation of 24 weeks 
of benefit rights whtch had been earned pnor to the date of his quit from 
the foundry 1 
A third claimant \vho \\as employed on a second shtft '' luch ended at 
12:30 a.m. had miSsed a considerable amount of work because he was 
unable to secure satisfactory transportation. He had been \\ amed by his 
employer about mtssmg \vork The claimant requested a transfer to 
either the first or third shift \\hen transportation \\ ould have been 
available. Betng unable to obtatn a transfer to another shift or to obtain 
dependable transportation on his current shift, the employee quit. 
A fourth ca e tn,·olved a female claimant \Vho had \vorked for one 
month as an assembler and w·as given a new job assignment, part of 
which involved the hftmg of bomb cases. The clatmant felt this \Vork 
was too heavy but upon requestmg lighter work \vas Informed that none 
was available. She then quit and PNO \veeks later obtained a job \Vtth 
a ne\v employer for '"hom she \vorked for three months before bemg 
latd off and filing her chum. The qutt three month<; ear her, ho\Ve\ er, 
resulted in dtsquahfication. 
The above four cases are cited not as quits \Vhtch \vould certainly be 
considered reasonable, but rather to illustrate the type of Situation \vhich 
\vould JUShf) careful consideration of all relevant factors causing the 
1. This case \\.as not included in the category .. quit to retunl to regular employer" 
discussed in Chapter IV. The quit of July 30 was not because of recall to h1s regular 
JOb but because the claimant felt the job involved exce<>sl\.e heat. 
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claimants to quit, and the reachmg of decisions based on all such facts 
rather than blanket definitional disqualifications because the quits could 
not be attnbuted to the employers. Can it be assumed that a quit was 
unjustified or unreasonable merely because it could not be attributed to 
the employer? 
B. Quits From Other Than the Most Recent Employer 
The second basic question to \vluch the Io,va law gives n se concerns 
the \VIsdom of disqualifying claimants whose disqualifymg acts took 
place on jobs other than the ones JUSt prior to the filmg of claims. Of the 
159 disquahfications stemming from quits due to employee dissatisfac-
tion or mvolving the Issue of whether the employee qwt or was dis-
charged, 121 or 77 per cent involved mdividuals who had mtervening 
employment between the dates they committed the rusquahfying acts 
and the dates they bled their clarms. These claimants lost $25,975 m 
benefit credits. vVhen these are added to the cases falling under the cate-
gon es discussed m Chapters III through VIII it IS found that 215 or 79 
per cent of all the voluntary quit disqualifications mvolved individuals 
With such mtervenmg employment, resulting m a loss of $59,629 in base 
pen od benefit credits. 
As has already been Indicated, \vhere employees quit because of ill-
ness, to accept recall to a regular employer, or for the other three cate-
gon es of reasons discussed in the earlier part of this study, there is great 
doubt as to the \Vtsdom of rmposmg voluntary leavmg disqualifications. 
This holds \vhether the quit was from the most recent employer or from 
an earlier employer Consider, however, those cases among the remain-
ing 159 which may have Involved quits \vithout good personal cause. 
To be sure, It \vould be unsound to permit an indiVIdual \vho has arbi-
tranly quit his last job to begm drawing benefits as soon as he has com-
pleted h1s wa1t1ng penod Is it not quite another matter, ho,vever, when 
such Individuals, rather than seekmg benefits, seek and find other work, 
thus giVIng concrete evidence that their quits \vere motiva ted by some-
thmg other than the des1re to loaf and dra\\' benefits? 
Many persons at one time or another get "fed up., \\·ith their \vork to 
the extent that they think sen ously of quitting, and some are unable to 
control this feehng long enough to ride out a "cn s1s ., Others are born 
optun1sts \\ ho feel they can do better else\vhere and act accordingly, 
despite the lack of reahsm of such a behef. Still others, particularly 
those \Vith limited 'vorking expen ence, require a period of trying differ-
ent JObs before fmding their "niche., These actions leading to voluntary 
quits stem from the basic psychological, emotional, and physiological 
characteristics of individuals as human beings. This is not to condone 
arbitrary or unjustified quittmg for such reasons, but rather to put in 
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proper peispectl\e the question of \\hcther quits occurnng up to 18 
months pnor to the f1hng of clarms and separated from the claimant's 
current unemployment by one or more JObs arc 1 cle\ ant to the mdividu-
al's current lack of work. 
These matters are extreme!} relevant to the employer who under the 
present la\\ has a drrect fmancial mterest 1n whether or not benefits arc 
paid. As mrucated earher, ho\Ve\ler, If the de\ ICe of the C(nonchargtng" 
account Is used the problem of the liabiht} of the employer can be 
treated on It O\\'D ments, and payment of benefits to claimants \vhen 
consistent '' Ith the obJectives of unemployment Insurance need not 
result 1n inequit\ or injustice to employers 
For a state such as Io\va \Vlnch IS m the process of industrialization 
the rusqualif1cat1on of claimants for quitS unrelated to their current un-
employment has particular relevance and Intex est lo\va IS ·urrently in 
the process of mdustrialization, \vith a consequent movement of em-
ployees from farms Into industry. This transition means that for man ' 
"orkers, pa1ticularh younger emplo\ ccs \Vith httle or no industrial 
expenence, a penod of adjustinent ts 1 cquircd, \VIth many having to 
change JObs a number of bmes before finding the1r places m the DC\\' 
environment. This adJustment needs to be fclcilitatcd not only through 
the efforts of industry. labor, and government to provide the necessary 
JOb openings but also to aid employees in acclimating themselves to tlw 
nev. conditions. Care must be taken to b ~ sure that unetnployrnent 
msurance aids and does not hinder thjs adjustment. ln a period of full 
employment employees are able to change jobs quite readily until they 
fmd ones \\'hich are suitable Should, ho\VC\ er, the pdst changing of 
jobs 1n the process of adjustment be pennitted to haunt th ~ employel) 
once a recession or other factors result in temporary unemployment? 
A denial or n•duction of benefits dunng a pt~riod of bona fide unernplo '-
ment because of past effort5 to adjust to industrial conditions or to obtain 
better \vages or \vorking conditions can onh Impede the proC('\~ of 
adjustment so vital to Iov.: as future \velfarc. 
It \viii be recalled that of the 51 jurisdictions In only nine other than 
lo\va do 5t,ttutes or court decisions impose disqualifications for quits 
from other tl1an the most recent employer. The rnajority of the junsdte-
tions have recognized that separations from other than the most recent 
employment ha\ e little if an) thing to do \vith the individual's current 
lack of work. 
C. Postpone1nent t Cancellation of Benefits 
An important aspect in 'vhich the Iowa la\v differs from tho!)e in most 
of the other states 1s that relating to the consequences of disqualification. 
It was pomted out m Chapter II that only 17 states m addition to Iowa 
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cancel wage credits as \vell as postpone benefits when a claimant is rus-
<fuahfied for c1 voluntary quit. Only Iowa, however, mcludes among 
credits cancelled those earned \Vtth employers who latd claunants off for 
lack of \Vor1.. In 33 JUnsdtctions, disqualification results only in a post-
ponement of benefits \Vith no cancellation of benefit n ghts. 
Unemployment msurance, like all other forms of insurance, is estab-
lished to pay benefits upon the occurrence of a specific event. Thus, life 
Insurance insures against the n sk of death, fire insurance covers the risk 
of frre. In the case of unemployment 1nsurance, the event msured against 
IS mvoluntary unemployment or unemployment \vluch the individual 
could not avoid through reasonable action. 
In all types of msurance, benefits are not patd \vhen the event 1nsured 
agamst does not occur, or \vhen the event IS not covered or 1s explicitly 
excluded from the pohcy. If a property damage policy excludes damage 
by flood, benefits are denied to a policy holder whose house was dam-
aged m tlus 1nanner. For social reasons and because of luruted funds , 
pubhc policy has seen fit not to pay unemployment msurance benefits 
for voluntary unemployment which could have been avoided by reason-
able action. In other \VOrds, voluntary unemployment of tlus type is an 
event which IS excluded from the coverage of unemployment insurance 
•Cpolicy." It is the function of the voluntary quit provision of most state 
laws to ensure that benefits ai e not patd upon the occurrence of this un-
covered event 2 Thus, the legislatures of the states have said, in effect. 
·'Unemployment caused by an unreasonable voluntary qwt is not the 
type of unemployment for \vhich benefits should be patd Therefore, 
\vhen a person suffenng unemployment \vhich is due to this type of 
action flies a claun, benef1ts are to be postponed " Although there IS 
general agreement that benefits should be postponed follo\ving a volun-
tary qwt \V1thout good cause opmions differ as to the length of the 
postponement pen od and 'vhether the period should be fixed by legis-
lation or should he a variable one \vithin limits prescribed by law 3 
2 For an excellent detru.led discussion of the risk controllmg function of dts-
quahflcations, and the parallels \vith other types of insurance see Paul H Saunders, 
op ctt 
3 Of the 33 Jurisdictions m \Vhich disquahfication resulb> m postponement of 
bene&ts without cancellation of benefit n ghts, 11 postpone benefits for a fixed num-
ber of weeks, ranging from 4 weeks plus the week of occurrence in Connecticut to 
8 weeks in Oregon Twelve states postpone benefi ts for a vanable number of weeks 
Ten states postpone benefits for the duration of the unemployment, w1th most of 
these requiring some minnnum amount of employment or wages to requalify. In the 
remaining 17 states other than Iowa wluch cancel benefit rights m addition to post-
poning benefits, the number of weeks cancelled in most cases is equal to the number 
of \'-·eeks of postponement. See Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws 
as of January 1, 1958, p. 88. 
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Cancellation of beneftt rights, ho'' ever, goes beyond the function of 
excluding voluntary unemployment from coverage Not only does it 
mean that benefit payment IS refused because the event was not covered 
by the "policy,'' but in addinon It levies a penalty to punish the indi-
vidual for committmg the act. Thus, a dts<Iualificahon proVIsion which 
requrres cancellation of benefit credtts is based on \vhat may be thought 
of as a "penalt) theory', of disquahftcation.4 That ts, It 1s the function of 
the dtsqualificatton to penahze the individual for commtttmg the dts-
quahfvmg act. The \ Oluntary IeaYing proviSIOn of the IO\\a Ia'v as In-
terpreted b) the Jo,va Supreme Court appears to be based on an almo~t 
pure ··penalty theory" of disqualification rather than upon a ' n s1. ex-
clusion theory 
An evaluation of the Io,va policy invoh es an anal) SIS of the appropri-
ateness of utihzmg the '(penalty theory'· of diS<Jualifica.tton, in contrast to 
the "nsk exclusion theory" found in th maJOrity of states It \vould 
appear to he sound public policy to refuse benefits to an Individual 
\vhose unemployment ts not the type covered by the la,v. Put another 
way, there IS much to be ~c.ud for a pohcy of not paying benefits to a 
claunant whose unemployment 15 due to an arbitrary quit, and to refuse 
to pay benefits for as long as Ius unemployment IS due to this factor. 
\\'hether cancellahon of benefit rights is sound policy, ho,vever 
depends on \vhether the community believes the individual's act of 
qwttmg a job 1s sufficiently antisocial to merit punishment, and \vhether 
a social msurance program is the appropriate device to police antisocial 
behavior. 
Assume for the moment that som ~ portion (or even all) of the 159 
<}Uits because of employee dissatisfaction \VCre \vithout good caus<. The 
unemployment resulting from these qutts \vould not and should not have 
been compensated , thus protecting the unemployment tn~urance trust 
fund Havmg alread} denied bcneftts to such individuals, should the\-
also be penahzed for havmg exercised their right to change JObs at \vtll , 
a nght which all nations of the free world constder baste? 
It I~ not posstble or necessary to discuss here the role of labor mobility 
in a free enterpnse economy, nor to a ttempt to define ho\v much labor 
mobility is good or bad. The crucial point IS that it ts one thing to deny 
an individual benefits because }us type of unemployment IS not covered 
by la\v, and It IS another tlung to punish him for changing JObs by can-
celling lus preVIously earned benefit rights If the state actually feels 
that qutttmg a job \vithout good cause IS an offense deservmg of a 
penalty, it \vould seem logical that It be made a misdemeanor under 
4 Katherine Kempfer op cit., p. 148. 
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~orne type of "anti-quiting" law As one wnter has pomted out, if it IS the 
mtenhon of wage cancellation to pnntsh or cbscourage quitting, the 
penalty does not apply equally to all those committmg the act, since only 
those who happen to file chums are punished. Those who do not file 
clauns or are not covered by the act remain untouched 5 The use of a 
soctal Insurance program to pohce moral or social conduct is lughly 
questionable. 
5. l ind 
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CHAPTER IX 
ummary and Conclusion 
Tlus study ha~ analyzed the' olunt,try c1uit disquabficatlon expenence 
under the Iowa Employment Secu11ty La'' as It IS reflected m the 272 
disqualiflCJ.tions unposed m the Cedar Haptds, Da\ en port, and Iow,t 
C1ty labor markets dunng the fourth <]Uarter of 1957 The author has 
focused Ius attention on the nclture of the voluntary quits \vhich resulted 
m d1squahficabon, and has exan1incd the Io,va pohcy m relation to the 
purposes of unemployment msurancc, the need for equit) to employees 
and employers, and its implications for ernployment behavior. 
The stud} has revealed that there 1s constderable need for reappraisal 
of se\ eral ke} proYlSIOns and interpretations of the present la\\'. The pro-
' ISion whtch should gn e Io,vans the greatest concern is the inflexible 
requirement that a 'oluntary qutt must be attnhutable to the employer 
if the claimant IS to escape dtsc}ualiftcation. 
r\. s tlus prov1ston has been Interpreted it has In pr,tctice rneant a re-
fusal to recognize that there are numerous compelling and sensible per-
sonal reasons for emplo)ees to leave \Vork. Thus, for example, 1t \\aS seen 
that stgruhcant numbers of employees \vho left \vork because of illness 
or accident or serious domestic ctrcumstances ''rere etther dented bene-
fits upon their re-entry into the labor market or had thetr eligibility 
reduced. The concept that no termination is justified unless it is due to 
some fault on the part of the employer is a difficult one to defend. 
In addition to the disqualification of individuals \vho had little or no 
alternative to leaving their \VOrk, the "attributable to the employer'' 
clause has resulted in disqualification of individuals \Vhose reasons for 
leavmg, \vlule not of a compelling nature, nevertheless are con~1stent 
w1th the economic \velfare of the community, employers as a group, and 
\\ 1th the objectlves and financial soundness of the unemployment insur-
ance S}Stem 1tself. Individuals \vho leave one job to accept a better one, 
\\ ho accept temporary employment rather than remain 1dl~ but accept 
recall to their regular employers or 'vho leave work to further their 
education, are follo\\•ing a pattcn1 of behavior \Vhich h,ts contrihut<~d 
greatly to the success of the free ent •rprise s\ stem. 
In 1945 the Io,va legislature recognized that leaving a job to accept 
better employment \\'as a socially ancl economically defensible act, and 
amended the Ia~· to exempt such action from disqualification. Unfortu-
nately, the proVIso requiring the employee to remain on the ne\\' job for 
12 continuous weeks, and the interpretation that as httle as one da) of 
unemployment on the better job breaks the requtred continult}, have 
nullified the effecnvenes~ of this amendment to a considerable <>xtent. 
Employers have a vttal stake in the upward mobility of labor. A social 
Insurance progr<'lm whtch discourages and penalizes employees who 
have sought to make fuller use of their potential through seeking and 
obtatnmg better employment, or who have attempted to improve their 
education and sktlls, does not serve the best Interests of the employers, 
the community, or the employee Similarly, the disquahfication of in-
dtVIduals \vho have chosen to accept temporary work while awaiting 
recall rather than remaining tdle and dra\vtng unemployment compensa-
tion makes little sense 1n a nation dedicated to the proposition that 
matenal well bc1ng must be earned through productive effort. 
The requrrements that the employee notify Ius prospective intenm 
employer that he desu es only temporary work, that the employer hire 
him on that ba '>is, and that the employee he able to prove with a pre-
ponderance of e\ tdence that such an understanding was reached, are 
1ll designed tf one is smcerely Interested in achtevmg the obJective of 
maXJmtztng \\'Otl and mtnunizmg Idleness. A number of the cases dis-
cussed m Ch<lpter IV 1nd1cated that employment mterVIe\vs are not 
ahvays conducted \.VIth maxunum thoroughness To expect employees 
to volunteer tnformah on which \vill lessen their chances of obtaining 
emplo)ment is unrealistic Even more unreahsb c IS the requirement that 
an employee be able to prove with a preponderance of eVIdence at some 
future tune the existence of an exphcit but un\vritten understanding as 
to the temporary nature of lus \vork. It 1s paradoxical that general 
economic and ethical considerations, as \vell as the philosophy of un-
employment Insurance 1tself, stress the Importance of working in con-
trast to remaintng idle and dra\vtng unemployment benefits, \vhile the 
Io'"'·a la\\ places 1n Jeopardy the benefit n ghts of indiVIduals \vho do so 
The ccattnbutable to the employer" requrrement IS apparently an out-
gro\vth of the fact that employer tax rates depend on the amount of 
benefits charged against therr expen ence ratmg accounts \Vhere an 
employer cannot be held responsible for the unemployment, It has been 
felt that benefits should not be paid in order not to penalize the em-
ployer As a result, the cnterion for payment of beneftts has come to be 
\vhether an employer's account can legitimately be charged, rather than 
whether the payment of benefits is consistent with the purposes of 
unemployment msurance. As mdicated in Chapter III, however, the 
deVIce of the "nonchargmg accountn provides a way out of the dilemma, 
since It enables benefits to be paid where consistent with the objectives 
of unemployment insurance, while preserving the basic method of cost 
allocation \vhich many feel is fair to employers. 
A second aspect of current Iowa policy which is open to question is 
the practice of imposing disqualifications for quits from other than the 
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most recent employer. The rationale for th1s pohcy \\ ould seem to be the 
same as that for the "attnbutable to the employer" clause Of the 272 
disquahf1cations 1n the three labo1 markets 215 were 1mposed for qu1ts 
from other than the most recent employer Such qu1ts cannot logtcally 
be held to be the cause of the unemploym ent for \vhich the employee IS 
eeking benefits. When a claimant's current unemployment is due to a 
layoff or to d.nv other reason'' h1ch 1s constdered compensable under the 
la,v, is 1t re,lsonable to deny 1um benehts hecau~e of an unrelated quit 
!:lOme time 1n the past? 
The thud maJOr question posed by the present hl\v relates to the ca.n-
cellabon of wage credits In conlr,lst to the postponement of beneftts, the 
latter practice be1ng the one follo,ved in the majority of states The 
cancellation of '' age credits constitutes a method of penahztng an em-
ployee for a particular type of beha' 1or--quitting a job \Vtthout good 
cause attributable to the employer. Such behavior may be more or less 
anbsoc1al, depending on one ~ standard of right or wrong. There are, 
howe\ er, strong grounds for the post bon that in a democracy govern-
ment should not seek to tie an employee to hts JOb by holding over hun 
the threat of'' age credit cancellation. Tlus IS not to say that government 
should aid emplo, ees m arbitrarily lea,mg their jobs by paying them 
unemployment Insurance \vhen they have done so. To refuse unemploy-
ment benefit s to a \vorker \Vho has arbitrarily quit Ius JOb, ho,vever, is far 
different from \viping out h is p,1st benefit rights so that they are unavail-
able at some future time \vhen he ts suffering unemployrnent caused by 
factors be) ond lus control, such as a recesston. The use of a social in-
surance program to discourage employee mobility constitutes the usc of 
an inappropriate mechanism to achieve a questionable end. 
All msurance programs, \vhether private or public, must maintain con-
stant v1g1lance against the natural human desire to "get something for 
nothing." Public concern that some individuals \Vill seek benefits to 
wh1ch they are not legally entitled IS realistic and leg1slatn. e provisions 
and administrative procedures 1nust be de' I sed to minunize possible 
abuse The problem IS one of selecting legislative pro' ISIOns and admin-
Istrative procedures \\:ruch \Vill best Shield the program againSt clbuse, 
\vlule enabling it to achieve Its objectives 
The public rightly becomes upset in cases where a married \voman. 
or an individual recently recovered from an Illness, has no desrre to \vork 
and IS not seeking work but is dra,ving unemployment benefit s Simi-
larly discouraging IS the thought of paying benefits to indtviduals \vho 
have quit their jobs for no good reason and are seeking paid vacations 
at state expense. Such abuse needs to be detected and eliminated . Is 1t 
not more reasonable, however, to concentrate on developing the adtnm-
65 
tstratlve skills and procedures necessary to detect such abuse, rather 
than assuming that all individuals who qwt for reasons not attributable 
to the emplo) er have done so \VIthout JUSbfication? 
Prl\ c1te Insui ancc companies administenng disability and hfe msur· 
ance pohctes, the fedeial government administermg Old Age and Sur· 
vivm s Insurance, and other pubhc and pnvate organizations faced with 
the responsibiht} of making similar decisions involvmg both fact and 
judgment ha\e found It possible to athact and train admmistrators with 
the necess,lr} skills. An extensn,e and Intensive effort to attract and 
develop admtntsr,ltors c,1pable of making a' good cause, proVISIOn work 
~~ fec.lstble and \vould represent a constructive step of major rmportance 
L nn ers1t1es, prn ate Insurance companies, states \vith over 20 years' 
e\.pcnence 1n admintstermg "good cause, proVIsions, and other pubhc 
l>I gant.lationc; offer a n ch source of potential trainmg and instruction. 
B\ rnc1king available such training to current employment security per· 
~onnel , and offering S<11an es and \VOrking conditions attractive to com-
petent Inruviduals, It IS reasonable to believe that a "good cause" 
pi o\ Is ton can be administered \vith efficiency and equality 
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TABLE A 
Average Employer Contribution Rate, Rated and Unrated 
Employers, by State, Calendar 1957 
( Rates expressed as per cent of taxable wages) 0 
State Rate State 
lll\ITED STAlE~ 1 31 
(51 ~tate\) 
Alabama 103 ~hs!>OUri 
Alaska 2.70 ~fontana 
Anzona 1.33 ~cbraska 
Arkan"ia"i 1.14 '\evada 
California 134 '\ c w Hamp!>lurc 
Colorado .. .68 '\ocw Jersey 
Connecticut ' 1 19 \le\\ Mextco 
Delaware 65 New York • 
D1strict of Columbia 71 orth Carolina 
Florida 64 '\orth Dakota 
Georgia 122 Oluo 
Ha" aii 102 Oklahoma 
Idaho 1.34 Oregon . . . . 
IllinOis 100 Pennsylvania 
Indiana 102 Rhode Island 
Iowa .70 South Carolina 
Kansas 108 ~outh Dakota 
kentuck\ 195 Tennessee 
-
Loms1ana 1.43 rc\.as 
\fame 158 Ctah 
\taryland 100 \ cnnont 
\fa ssachu!>ett' 155 \ 1r~inia 
\flchtgan 204 \\ ashington 
\hnnesota .68 \\est Vrrgm1a 
\h,sissippi 165 \Visconsin 
\\ yommg 
0 Source U S Department of Labor, Bureau of Employment Security. 
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Rate 
.98 
122 
95 
1.98 
L.58 
1.73 
117 
177 
1.45 
1.51 
.72 
.97 
L.43 
1.55 
270 
118 
96 
L 75 
63 
1.31 
1 32 
.53 
2 11 
l.l4 
1 10 
l 12 
TABLE B 
General "Good Cause" and Restricted "Good Cause' Requirements 
m Voluntary Lcavmg ProVl!>lOil.S of 51 Stat~ 
and Junsdictions as of October, 1958° 
States whtch do not rmpose dtsqualificatiom where the employee quits work for 
.. good cause .. ( 31 states) 
Alaska ~laryland Oregon 
California \lassac.husetts Penns\ lvania 
Colorado ~ f lS"l"Sl pp1 Rhode Island 
Dtstnct of Colum hia ~fontana ~outh Carolina 
Florida '\ebraska South Dakota 
Hawaii ·evada Utah 
Idaho "'\ e,, Jer~C) Virginia 
Illmots e'" ~texico \Vashington 
Indiana '\e'" 'I ork \Vyoming 
Kansas orth Dakota 
Kentucky Ohio 
tates which r~tnct "good cau~c" to "good cause attributable to the employer," 
'connected wtth the work," or .. involving fault on the part of the employer" ( 20 
states) 
Alabama Louisiana Oklahom,t 
An zona :\1ainc Tennc ... sce 
Arkans~t'~ \1ichigan Texas 
Conncctlcut \hnnc..<>ota Vcnnont 
Delaware ~1ts..,ouri \Vest Virginia 
Georgia '\ e'v Ha.mpshir<• \Vbconsin 
Iowa '\orth Carolina 
0 Source Compar~on of State Unemployment Insurance Laws a.\ of January 1, 
1958, p 88 Effective October 27, 1958, Massachusc.tts deleted the "attributable to 
the employmg urut or its agent" clause from Its \IOluntary leaving disqualificatwn. 
(CCII, Vol 4, par. 1975) 
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TABLE. C 
St.ltes \Vhich Omit Charges to Employer Accounts for Benefits Paid Following 
Periods of Disqualification for Voluntary Quits, or for Benefits Paid 
Followmg Potentially D1squahfymg Quits for \VhlCh f\lo 
DlSquahncations \Vere Imposed, January 1, 1958 ( 36 States) o 
Alabama Kentucky Ohw 
Arizona Maine Oklahoma 
Arkansas \1aryland Oregon 
California ~1assachusetts Pennsylvania 
Colorado tvhnnesota ~outh Carolina 
Connecticut \h"iSOUri South Dakota 
Delaware \'fontana Tennessee 
Florida ~ebraska Texas 
Georg1a e\\ Hampshrre Vermont 
Hawaii ew ~1exico West V ugin1a 
Idaho orth Carolina Wisconsm 
Kansas "Jorth Dakota \Vyoming 
0 Source Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance LattJS as of January 1, 
1958 pp. 34-37 
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